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ABSTRACT 
Traditional financial theory, assuming rationality and stock market prices justified by 
fundamentals, has failed to explain the occurrence of several large stock market crises. 
Theories in behavioral finance suggest stock market overvaluation, eventually leading to 
stock market crises, partly occur due to noise trading. In this thesis, noise is captured through 
investor sentiment with the purpose of investigating the relationship between stock market 
crises and investor sentiment. Individual investor sentiment is the general optimism or 
pessimism towards the present and future economy among individual investors. To proxy the 
individual investor sentiment Consumer Confidence Indices have been used. Results, from 
logit and OLS models, show that an increase in investor sentiment optimism seems to increase 
the probability of stock market crises occurring on four major stock markets. Further, the 
effect of investor sentiment explaining stock market returns seems to have been larger during 
the subprime mortgage crisis than during the dot-com bubble. 
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1 INTRODUCTORY BACKGROUND 
According to the efficient market hypothesis all market information as well as all stock 
specific information is reflected in the price of a stock (Fama, 1970). Theories in traditional 
financial economics, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), assume the market 
participants to be rational. Further, the financial markets are considered to be efficient since 
arbitrageurs will offset any eventual mispricing in the market (Shleifer, 2000). Contrary, 
according to behavioral finance, the traditional financial theories assuming efficient markets 
have several limitations. Behavioral finance theory incorporates psychological aspects and the 
behavior of market participants in order to fully explain how financial markets behave. It 
considers that the individual market participants do not necessarily act in rational ways at all 
time and that there is something such as a market psychology. Thaler (2000) argues that 
market participants, whom in traditional finance are assumed rational in fact often behave 
irrational. Further, market participants are subject to irrational overreaction to unexpected and 
dramatic news (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985) and Shiller (1995) argues that investors are also 
subject to herd-like behavior. Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman and Schwartz (1997) introduce the 
theory of myopic loss aversion, claiming that investors are more sensitive to losses than to 
gains and that they frequently evaluate their outcomes. All these, and many others, individual 
psychological aspects need according to behavioral finance to be taken into consideration 
when studying the financial markets. Many anomalies in traditional theory can partly be 
explained by the inclusion of various behavioral finance aspects. Further, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) argue that the psychology of the investor has a role in explaining stock market 
returns. 
Such traders trading on psychological aspects rather than on fundamentals only can be 
defined as noise traders (Black, 1986). Traders trade on the lack of new information rather 
than on real information and Black (1986) claims that one reason for noise traders to trade on 
noise can be that they do not realize that they are trading on noise but rather believe that the 
noise in fact is information. Trading provides the market with liquidity as well as makes the 
market irrational. De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) present a model in 
which these noise traders are welcome. They provide evidence that security prices at times 
can be overvalued as compared to fundamentals due to noise trading. Moreover, it can be 
difficult for arbitrageurs to act against noise traders due to, for example, limited liquidity in 
certain stocks. Noise trading can thus lead to a large difference between market price and 
what the price should be according to the fundamentals and thus traditional financial theory. 
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Several financial anomalies occur due to noise trading. (De Long, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldmann, 1990) 
This noise trading can be quantified as the investor sentiment. Investor sentiments are the 
beliefs about future asset values that not are justified by fundamentals (Baker & Wurgler, 
2006). When investors are irrational and make investments on noise instead of on 
fundamentals and this becomes systematic, then it becomes an extra source of risk which 
should be priced at the market (Brown, 1999). Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Brown and Cliff 
(2005) claim that the limited arbitrage possibilities can explain the existence of over- and 
underpricing due to noise trading. Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue that, when arbitrage 
possibilities are limited then movements of investor sentiment are an important determinant of 
security prices. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that trading against noise traders can be both 
risky and costly and that arbitrageurs therefore do not force the price to the level that would 
have been in an efficient market. 
Irrational noise trading can also have impact on financial crises. Shiller (1987) finds that 
the main reason for the American stock market crash in 1987 was overpricing, and De Long 
and Shleifer (1991) argue that stock market prices prior to the 1929 stock market crisis were 
overvalued as compared to fundamentals due to highly optimistic investor sentiment. Despite 
this, few attempts have been made to focus specifically on the link between investor sentiment 
and financial crises.  
The purpose of this thesis is to capture the noise component which makes markets 
irrational through investor sentiment, and test whether investor sentiment can affect the 
probability of stock market crises occurring. Several studies have found that investor 
sentiment seems to affect stock market returns. Thus, the hypothesis in this thesis is that 
investor sentiment also affects stock market crises and the probability of them occurring. 
Further it will be investigated if investor sentiment explain stock market returns and whether 
it can do so during periods defined to be stock market crises. 
As previously mentioned, if investor sentiment has an effect on equity prices it contradicts 
traditional theory assuming rationality and efficiency. Investor sentiment is a rather vague 
concept regarding the general consumer confidence about the economy and there is no general 
measure used by all researchers in order to capture the investor sentiment, hence it can be 
measured through both direct and indirect measures. The direct measure can for example be 
surveys about consumers’ general opinion, while an indirect measure is a measure which tries 
to use financial and economic variables that correlate with the investor sentiment.  
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This thesis will investigate the relationship between stock market crises and investor 
sentiment for nine countries from 2000 until 2014. The countries included in the sample are 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. Crises will be identified by the CMAX measure proposed by Patel and Sarkar 
(1998), and both OLS models and logit models will be used while connecting the crises to the 
investor sentiment. The direct measures of Consumer Confidence Indices are used to measure 
investor sentiment and to serve as proxies for the general thoughts about the present and 
future economy.  
Results show that investor sentiment seems to affect the occurrence of stock market crises 
in several countries. In Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States the 
probability of a stock market crises occurring increases when investor sentiment increases. 
Generally, high investor sentiment seem to have had a higher influence on the subprime 
mortgage crisis starting in 2007 than on the dot-com bubble during the first couple of years in 
the 21
st
 century. These findings contribute to the research done in the area of connecting 
investor sentiment to stock market crises. Further, it contributes to the understanding of how 
investor sentiment has affected stock market returns during different crises. 
Section 2 will provide the theoretical framework regarding investor sentiment and its link 
to stock market returns and stock market crises. In Section 3, the data and methodology is 
presented. Section 4 presents and analyses the results while Section 5 concludes. 
 
  
4 
  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are numerous studies investigating the relationship between investor sentiment and 
stock market returns and a few investigate the relationship between investor sentiment and 
stock market crises. Studies have been made on different markets, during different time 
periods, through different methods and by using different measures of investor sentiment, and 
results seem to depend upon these differences. This section will serve as a general overview 
on what investor sentiment is and how it can be measured, on the research done in the area of 
connecting investor sentiment to stock market returns in general, and on what has been done 
in the area of connecting investor sentiment to stock market crises. 
 
2.1 DEFINITION OF INVESTOR SENTIMENT 
De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) define investor sentiment to be excess 
return over fundamental expectations. Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that investor 
sentiment is the optimism or pessimism about a given asset or the propensity to speculate, 
while Baker and Wurgler (2007) define it as the belief about future cash flows and risk with 
investment that is unable to be justified by fundamental facts. These beliefs about future 
investment expectations can bring over- and undervaluation on stock market prices and thus 
affect pricing models (Baker & Wurgler, 2007).  
  
2.2 MEASURES OF INVESTOR SENTIMENT 
In order to measure these beliefs one can proxy investor sentiment either through direct or 
indirect measures. Brown and Cliff (2004) find that the direct and indirect measures are 
related. A direct measure is a market survey while an indirect measure is a financial variable 
used as an indicator of the public opinion. Such financial variables can for example be the 
number of IPOs, the first day returns on IPOs, closed-end fund discount (which some consider 
to be a measure of small investor sentiment), the market liquidity measured as trading 
volume, retail investors trade, mutual fund flow, dividend premium, and insider trading to 
name a few. All these financial variables have been considered behavioral factors which can 
explain the current investor sentiment (Bathia & Bredin, 2013). 
There are also several different direct measures of investor sentiment. Apart from using it 
in their own study, Zouaoui, Nouyrigat and Beer (2011) argue that the direct measure 
Consumer Confidence Index is used by numerous researchers. Examples of other papers that 
use the Consumer Confidence Index as a measure of investor sentiment are Schmeling (2009), 
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Ho and Hung (2009), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and Qiu and Welch (2006). The 
Consumer Confidence Indices are measured and released by several different centers or 
organizations. Zouaoui, Nouyrigat and Beer (2011) use the Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index Survey to track the Consumer Confidence at the United States market and the 
Economic European Commission calculated Consumer Confidence Indices are used for the 15 
European countries included in their study. The Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index Survey 
is a monthly index based on survey responses on questions regarding households’ current and 
expected financial conditions, the Economic European Commission uses similar questions in 
their survey, which makes the two indices comparable. 
Other researchers use the Investors’ Intelligence Sentiment Index (Lee, Jiang & Indro, 
2001) as the measure for the United States market and the Sentix Eurostoxx 50 as a proxy for 
the countries at the European market (Corredor, Ferrer & Santamaria, 2015). The Investors’ 
Intelligence Sentiment Index is a weekly announced index, where newsletters are read and 
categorized depending on their general view about the future. These professionally written 
newsletters regarding expectations of future market moves are, depending on their view about 
the future, categorized into three categories; bullish, bearish or neutral. The fact that they are 
subjective written newsletters with in many cases different time horizons can lead to problems 
when for example making comparisons. Since the majority of the newsletters contributing to 
the Investors’ Intelligence Sentiment Index is written by current or retired professionals, the 
index can be used as a proxy for institutional investor sentiment (Brown & Cliff, 2004). 
Another index worth mentioning is the investor sentiment index for individual investors 
by the American Association of Individual Investors. It is a direct measure containing the 
answers from a random sample of the members of the American Association of Individual 
Investors, where the participants respond to the question if they think that the stock market 
will be up, down or at the same level as now in six months’ time from now. One problem with 
this index is that it contains the answers of only 137 respondents on average each time 
(Brown & Cliff, 2004). Other direct measures are for example the UBS Gallup Survey and the 
measure by the Conference Board (Bathia & Bredin, 2013). 
Other types of more creative measures are not uncommon either. Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) use principal component analysis to construct their indirect measure of investor 
sentiment for the US market based on several financial variables. Feldman (2010) calculates a 
sentiment index, which he calls the perceived loss index, by using mutual funds data. He finds 
that his index can be used to predict stock market returns at a horizon of one to two years and 
that the index can be used as a quantitative measure to detect bubbles and financial crises. Da, 
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Engelberg and Gao (2015) uses daily internet searches by millions of people in order to find a 
good measure of investor sentiment and find that their index, known as the Financial and 
Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS), predict short term stock returns. Huang, 
Jiang, Tu and Zhou (2015) construct their own investor sentiment index by eliminating noise 
components in the sentiment proxies and find that their index can predict stock returns. 
Joseph, Wintoki and Zhang (2011) examine if investor sentiment can forecast abnormal stock 
returns and trading volumes when investor sentiment is measured through a method of 
analyzing online searches for different stock market tickers (for example AAPL for Apple 
Inc.). Their research finds that these online searches for tickers can predict stock returns over 
a weekly horizon. 
There are obviously advantages as well as disadvantages with all the different types of 
measures. For direct measures problems with availability can limit the study both when it 
comes to which market and to which time period that is available to observe. For example, 
Zhang, Deng and Yang (2010) find that there is no good direct measure for the Chinese 
market and therefore they feel obliged to use the indirect measure of the growth rate of 
investor accounts as a proxy of investor sentiment instead. Qiu and Welch (2006) find that an 
advantage of using the indirect measures over direct measures is that they provide better 
sample size, but that a disadvantage is that they have a weaker statistical link to investor 
sentiment than the direct measures does. Another problem with indirect measures is that they 
might not only represent the investors sentiment since they can be made up of all different 
macroeconomic and financial variables (Zouaoui, Nouyrigat & Beer, 2011). Ferrer, Salaber 
and Zalewska (2014) investigate how the relationship between stock market returns and the 
Consumer Confidence Index vary over time for 12 European Union countries and for the 
United States by looking at data from 1990 to 2010. Their conclusion is that the Consumer 
Confidence Index is not a good measure of investor sentiment. Brown and Cliff (2004) find 
that direct and indirect measures of investor sentiment are correlated but also that they both 
have little power in explaining near-future stock returns. Bathia and Bredin (2013) examine 
different types of proxies for investor sentiment, where the Consumer Confidence Index is 
among them, and find that investor sentiment in general has significant influence on stock 
market returns.  
 
2.3 INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND STOCK MARKET RETURNS 
According to Dergiades (2012) there is no uniformity in the findings of the different studies 
regarding the relationship between investor sentiment and stock market returns. This can have 
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several explanations, for example in which way the investor sentiment index is constructed 
(Dergiades, 2012). But in fact it can be important to measure the investor sentiment in various 
ways depending on the type of investor that is the objective of observation. Fischer and 
Statman (2000) find that investors are not alike and that there are three types of groups of 
investors’. The small individual investors, the medium writers of investment newsletters, and 
the large Wall Street strategists. Their findings show that the sentiment of the individual 
investors and the Wall Street strategists are virtually unrelated. 
Several studies show that changes in equity values and consumer sentiment are correlated 
(Otoo, 1999). Studies find that when the investor sentiment is high then subsequent equity 
returns will fall, indicating that during a period of optimistic investor sentiment equities tend 
to be overvalued and during a period of pessimistic investor sentiment equities seem to be 
undervalued and return to a value closer to the one that can be justified according to 
fundamentals (Chen, Chen & Lee, 2013). Brown and Cliff (2005) show contrary to their 
earlier findings in Brown and Cliff (2004) that excessive optimism is followed by low 
cumulative long run returns, which indicate that during excessive optimism there is indeed 
market overvaluation. Baker and Wurgler (2006) find through their principal component 
analysis method that different stocks act differently; stocks that are hard to value or hard to 
arbitrage are more affected by investor sentiment than other stocks. The effect between 
market returns are higher for stocks whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to 
arbitrage. Schmeling (2009) investigate the relationship in 18 industrialized countries and 
finds that when investor sentiment is high future stock returns tend to be lower in general. 
This relationship seems to be different in different countries as Schmeling (2009) finds that 
the institutional quality and various cultural factors in the countries play an important role. 
Also Bathia and Bredin (2013) find a negative relationship between investor sentiment and 
future stock returns when investigating the markets for the G7 countries using monthly data 
between 1995 and 2007. Further, the results of Bathia and Bredin (2013) show that the effect 
of survey sentiment is stronger for value stocks than for growth stocks. Baker, Wurgler, and 
Yuan (2012) look at local sentiment for six countries as well as putting them together into one 
global sentiment measure and find that there is a negative relationship between investor 
sentiment and future stock market returns. Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) find that investor 
sentiment can predict stock market returns while Huang, Jiang, Tu, and Zhou (2015) find that 
both the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index as well as the Conference Board's Consumer 
Confidence Index fails to significantly forecast the future monthly excess returns. 
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Some researchers find that the relationship between investor sentiment and stock market 
returns go in the other direction. Canbas and Kandir (2009) claim that stock returns affect 
indirect measured investor sentiment proxies at the Turkish market and that investor 
sentiment does not appear to forecast future stock returns. Yu, Huang, and Hsu (2014) find 
that the relationship goes from stock returns to investor sentiment at the Taiwanese market as 
well. Brown and Cliff (2004) also find that past market returns are important in determining 
the investor sentiment. Contrary to other findings they claim there is little predictive power in 
investor sentiment for near-term future stock market returns. Despite all this lack of 
uniformity in empirical evidence when investigating the relationship between stock markets 
returns and investor sentiment, Baker and Wurgler (2007) claim that the question in today’s 
finance should be how to measure investor sentiment and quantify its effects since they regard 
the fact that investor sentiment affect stock prices a well-known fact. 
There are few studies trying to investigate the relationship between investor sentiment and 
stock market crises. Siegel (1992) uses the direct measure Investors’ Intelligence Sentiment 
Index to measure investor sentiment and finds that even though the investor sentiment index 
correlates with stock market returns it is uncertain whether the investor sentiment affected the 
stock market crash of 1987 in the United States. Also Baur, Quintero and Stevens (1996) 
investigate the relationship between investor sentiment and the stock market crash of 1987 in 
the United States. By using weekly data and investor sentiment measured as the discount or 
premium of the prices on closed-end funds relative to their net asset values they find no 
evidence that investor sentiment contributed to the stock market crash of 1987. They claim 
that a reason for this could be that they measure investor sentiment in an inappropriate way or 
that investor sentiment simply did not have an effect on that stock market crash (Baur, 
Quintero and Stevens, 1996).  
Zouaoui, Nouyrigat, and Beer (2011) examine the relationship between investor sentiment 
and stock market crises, in the United States and in 15 countries in the European Union from 
April 1995 to June 2009 by using the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index and the Economic 
European Commission calculated Consumer Confidence Index as the investor sentiment 
measures. They try to find out if periods with an optimistic investor sentiment are followed by 
stock market crises and find that investor sentiment increases the probability of a stock market 
crisis to occur within the following one year period, especially so in countries with low 
institutional involvement and countries that culturally overreact more and have more of a 
herd-like behavior. 
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3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The main objective of this thesis is to test if investor sentiment can explain the occurrence of 
stock market crises and stock market returns during crisis periods. This section will describe 
the data and methodology used during the investigation of this. Due to data availability the 
time period looked upon is limited to January 2000 to December 2014 with some minor 
exceptions. This time period makes up to 180 data observations per country. All financial data 
used is monthly and have been extracted from DataStream and the International Financial 
Statistics database. All data have been seasonally adjusted when needed and if required 
transformed from quarterly to monthly data through cubic spline interpolation. The countries 
used in this study, which also have been chosen for availability reasons, as well as the 
corresponding price indices used can be found in TABLE 1. 
 
TABLE 1: COUNTRIES AND PRICE INDICES IN THE SAMPLE 
Belgium BEL 20 
Denmark OMX COPENHAGEN 20 
France FRANCE CAC 40 
Germany DAX 30 
Italy MILAN COMIT 30 
Spain IBEX 35 
Sweden OMX STOCKHOLM 30 
United Kingdom FTSE 100 
United States S&P 500 COMPOSITE 
Table 1 shows the countries as well as the corresponding price indices used in the study. These particular price indices represents the 
largest companies in each particular country and has been chosen since they provide available data for the whole time period required and 
since corresponding dividend yields and price-earnings ratios are calculated based on these indices. 
 
Initially Augmented Dickey Fuller tests for unit root have been performed on all series in 
order to test whether they are stationary or not (see Dickey & Fuller, 1979 and Said & Dickey, 
1984). The first differences have been taken on all non-stationary series in order to make them 
stationary. The remainder of this section will describe the way of identifying crises as well as 
the variables used and the regression models estimated. 
 
3.1 CRISIS IDENTIFICATION 
In order to identify crises a measure known as CMAX have been used. It is a measure of a 
crisis indicator developed by Patel and Sarkar (1998). It is the same measure that is used by 
Zouaoui, Nouyrigat and Beer (2011) and even though this does not mean that all identified 
crises in this thesis will be the same as the ones identified in their study, since the time span 
and type of price indices differ, it makes it fairer to draw comparisons to their results if the 
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same method of identifying crises is applied. The formulas used for calculating the CMAX 
measure are: 
 
 
𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
max⁡(𝑃𝑖,𝑡−24, … , 𝑃𝑖,𝑡)
 (1) 
 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓⁡𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 < 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 2𝜎𝑖 (2) 
 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 (3) 
 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the stock market index price for country⁡𝑖 at time 𝑡. If the CMAX value for country 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡 is smaller than the average CMAX for that country minus 2 standard deviations (which 
can be seen as a threshold level), then a crash is triggered that specific month. The 
corresponding crisis is defined to start at the month where the price index is at its maximum 
during the 24 month preceding the indication month of the crash. The trough of a crisis is 
when the price index reaches its low and the recovery of a crisis is defined to be when the 
price index again reaches heights above the price level at the start of the crisis. See FIGURE 1 
for a graphical example of the CMAX measure and how it is used to identify crises.  
 
FIGURE 1: CRISIS IDENTIFICATION IN SWEDEN 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the method of identifying crises by CMAX for Sweden between 2000 and 2014. The development of the price index OMXS30 
have value on the right hand axis. The CMAX Ratio (the dashed line) and the CMAX threshold (the horizontal line) have numbers on the left 
hand axis. 
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A crash is indicated when the CMAX ratio (the dashed line) cross the CMAX threshold line 
from above. This happens in June 2002, so at that month a crash is triggered, but the crisis 
started in August 2000 when the price index was at its maximum during the 24 month 
preceding the trigger month. The trough is at January 2003 when the index reaches its low and 
the recovery happens in December 2013 when the price index once again reaches above the 
value at the start of the crisis. This is the only identified crisis in Sweden since the CMAX 
ratio does not cross the CMAX threshold from above more than once (even though it is close 
to happening in 2008). 
A problem with the CMAX measure’s way of identifying crises is that when a crisis is 
identified then the price index has been dropped a substantial amount already, hence to predict 
a crisis is something totally different. 
By coding each month from the start of the crisis until the trough with 1 and all other 
months with 0 we get a time series of zeroes and ones for each country. Note that there can be 
several crises for a country. From these time series of zeroes and ones another time series of 
zeroes and ones is created by using a methodology suggested by Bussiere and Fratzscher 
(2006). Their methodology suggests coding ones during the twelve months preceding a crisis 
and also suggests excluding the eleven months following a trough from the sample. Hence, 
the eleven months following the end of a crisis period (that is after the trough) are coded with 
“n.a.” and are not included in the regressions. For all countries included in the sample at least 
one crisis has been identified, and for a majority of the countries two crises are identified. All 
identified crises occur either during the first couple of years of the 21
st
  century during the 
dot-com bubble or during the recent financial subprime mortgage crisis, starting in 2007. 
Since crisis-periods are identified non-crisis periods are also identified. A non-crisis period 
can be a period before, in between, or after a crisis. 
Based on these time series of zeroes and ones it is possible to distinguish between crisis 
and non-crisis periods and make regressions on the specific crisis-periods and the non-crisis-
periods. The crisis codes can also be used as an explanatory dummy variable. It is also 
possible to use this binary time series as the independent variable in a binary logit regression 
model. All identified crisis can be found in TABLE 2. 
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TABLE 2: CMAX IDENTIFIED CRISES 
Country Crisis Crash Trough Recovery Months crisis-trough 
Belgium 2007/05 2008/10 2009/02 n.a. 21 
      
Denmark 2000/10 2002/09 2003/02 2005/07 28 
 2007/09 2008/10 2009/03 2013/01 18 
      
France 2000/08 2002/08 2003/03 n.a. 31 
 2007/05 2009/02 2009/03 n.a. 21 
      
Germany 2000/08 2002/08 2003/03 2007/04 31 
 2007/12 2009/02 2009/03 2013/05 15 
      
Italy 2007/04 2008/12 2009/02 n.a. 22 
      
Spain 2000/09 2002/09 2003/01 2006/01 28 
 2007/10 2009/02 2009/03 n.a. 17 
      
Sweden 2000/08 2002/06 2003/01 2013/12 29 
      
United Kingdom 2000/08 2002/07 2003/01 2007/05 29 
 2007/10 2008/10 2009/02 2013/10 16 
      
United States 2000/08 2002/07 2002/09 2007/05 25 
 2007/10 2008/10 2009/02 2013/03 16 
Table 2 report all identified crises from 2000 to 2014 for the nine countries of interest. The starting month of a crisis is the month when the price index reaches its maximum value during the 24 months prior to a 
stock market crash. A crash is triggered when the CMAX ratio cross the threshold level from above. A price index has recovered from a crisis when the price index again reaches above the value at the start of the 
crisis. If the price index is yet to recover then the month of recovery is coded with n.a. When running regressions twelve months prior to the start of a stock market crisis is coded as ones together with the crisis. 
Eleven months after a trough is left out of the sample. 
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3.2 INVESTOR SENTIMENT 
As presented in the literature review section there is not yet any measure of investor sentiment 
that is used by all researchers. Hence, a choice has to be made of how to measure the investor 
sentiment. The Consumer Confidence Index has been chosen for several reasons. The 
Consumer Confidence Indices for the countries of interest have been found at the Economic 
European Commission’s website for all European countries and through the database of the 
Michigan Research Center for the United States data. Both these sources use similar questions 
in order to measure the consumer confidence which makes them comparable (Zouaoui, 
Nouyrigat & Beer, 2011).
1
 The measures are general in the sense that they are calculated 
using the same survey questions for all European countries and with very similar questions 
used in the United States. The indices have been measured monthly since the mid 1980’s for 
most European countries and even longer in the United States, which makes the time span of 
the measures long enough. Even though these indices represent the beliefs of individual 
investors about the economy and not their beliefs about future stock prices, Qiu and Welch 
(2006) find that they make a good measure anyway since the indices are correlated with stock 
prices. See FIGURE 2 for a graphical representation of the Consumer Confidence Index and 
the price index in Sweden. 
FIGURE 2: PRICE INDEX, SENTIMENT & PURER SENTIMENT IN SWEDEN 
 
The Investor Sentiment (the dashed line), as extracted from the database, and the purer measure of investor sentiment (the thin line) has 
the values on the left hand axis. The price index, in the case of Sweden, the OMXS30 (the thick line) has the values according to the right 
hand axis. 
                                                          
1
 See the appendix for exact wording of the survey questions.  
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The measure of investor sentiment that can be extracted from the databases of the European 
Commission and the Michigan Research Center contain fundamental macroeconomic factors. 
These can be regressed away by an OLS regression in order to receive a purer measure of the 
investor sentiment measure.  
 
 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
 
The fundamental macroeconomic factors used since they are considered to be related to 
business cycles are the following. 𝐼𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the change in the natural logarithm of the industrial 
production index for country 𝑖, 𝐻𝐸 is the change in the natural logarithm of household 
expenditure, 𝑆𝑇 is the term spread, which is the difference between the yield on a 3 month 
Treasury bill and the yield on a 10 year government bond, and 𝐷𝑌 is the dividend yield for 
country 𝑖 at time 𝑡. Both 𝑆𝑇 and 𝐷𝑌 have been made stationary by the method of difference. 
All these fundamental macroeconomic factors have been chosen since they are used by 
Zouaoui, Nouyrigat and Beer (2011), the aim is to receive investor sentiment measures as 
similar to the ones used by them as possible. The residuals make a purer measure of investor 
sentiment than the normal Consumer Confidence Indices extracted from the databases does 
since various macroeconomic variables have been deleted from the measure. 
Both Zouaoui, Nouyrigat, and Beer (2011) as well as Chung, Hung and Yeh (2012) find it 
necessary to run a regression of this type, save the residuals and use the residuals as a measure 
of the purer sentiment value. Also Wolff (2013) runs a regression with various 
macroeconomic variables in order to obtain a macroeconomic trend free measure of investor 
sentiment. By running the above regression by OLS and saving the residuals we can use the 
residuals as a purer measure of investor sentiment. 
 
3.3 MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES EXPLAINING CRISES 
There are not many studies investigating which variables explain stock market crises 
(Zouaoui, Nouyrigat & Beer, 2011). Coudert and Gex (2008) identify the price-earnings ratio, 
the real interest rate, the year-on-year changes in stock prices, and risk aversion measuring 
indices such as the VIX, to be good predictors of stock market crises while investigating the 
effects of these variables on stock market crises in 27 countries between 1995 and 2005. 
Other studies show that the price level, measured as the inflation rate, is related to stock 
market prices and thus also affect stock market crises (Pearce, 1982). A more extensive 
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description of each of these variables and why they are relevant in explaining stock market 
crises will now follow. 
The implied volatility of options can be measured through the VIX and VSTOXX indices. 
The VIX shows the market expectation of 30-day volatility on the American market. It was 
introduced by Chicago Board Options Exchange in 1993 and has been calculated ever since. 
The VSTOXX is the equivalent at the European market, introduced in 1999. The indices are 
usually known as “fear indices” and measure how much the market is willing to pay against 
the risk of price movements, hence they measure risk aversion. Empirical tests by Coudert 
and Gex (2008) show that such indices tend to increase prior to financial crises. Thus they can 
be good at predicting stock market crises. In this thesis the VIX will be used in the United 
States only, while the VSTOXX will be used to capture the volatility for all European 
countries. 
The price-earnings ratio (PER) is measured by dividing the market price of a stock by its 
earnings. This can be done for total stock market price indices as well. Campbell and Shiller 
(2001) show that when the price-earnings ratio is relatively high then future stock prices will 
probably go down. This finding is consistent with the theory of mean reversion which say 
prices revert to their long-term mean. Coudert and Gex (2008) find that high price-earnings 
ratios increase the probability of a stock market crisis to occur. A high price-earnings ratio 
might indicate that the underlying stock is overvalued (Coudert and Gex, 2008). 
The interest rate (INT) is measured by the money market rate and made stationary by 
taking the first differences. Interest rates tend to have a negative relation to stock market 
prices. Coudert and Gex (2008) find that real interest rates are related to stock market crises 
and claim that interest rates usually decline prior to a stock market crisis. 
The one-year return (RET) on stock prices is calculated from the corresponding price 
index. Since we identify a crisis when it already started we expect the one-year return to 
already have dropped. Thus the sign of the one-year return is expected to be negative. 
(Coudert & Gex, 2008)  
Several studies show the relationship between the inflation rate (INF) and stock market 
prices. Pearce (1982) finds that the relationship between the inflation rate and stock market 
returns is negative. Also, Fama and Schwert (1977) provide evidence, while studying monthly 
data at the American market 1953-1971, that the relationship between stock market returns 
and the inflation rate is negative. Bordo and Wheelock (1998) claim that fluctuations in the 
price level, the inflation, contribute to financial instability. Stock prices tend to be negatively 
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correlated with inflation. In order to measure the inflation rate the logarithmic change in the 
harmonized consumer price indices has been used. 
 
3.4 MODELS RUN 
In order to check the robustness of the results, three different models have been run in the 
attempt of investigating the relationship between investor sentiment and stock market crises: 
(i) A binary logit model run for each country where the crisis-codes are the dependent 
variable. (ii) An OLS model with the one month stock return as the dependent variable is run 
during the whole sample period for each country, also including a dummy variable coded for 
crisis and non-crisis periods. (iii) A simple OLS model with one month stock market return as 
the dependent variable is run for each type of period for each country. All models have been 
estimated in EViews 8. This subsection will explain all three models in more detail. 
 
3.4.1 LOGIT MODEL 
The explained variable in the logit model is the times series of the coded crises. A crisis code 
coded as 1 equals a crisis while 0 indicates a non-crisis period. So a model of this type is 
testing which independent variables explain the probability that a crisis will occur. Among the 
independent variables all previously mentioned macroeconomic variables and the behavioral 
variable of investor sentiment are included. Three different logit models are run. The first one 
includes the traditionally macroeconomic variables only, the second model includes only the 
purer measure of investor sentiment variable, while the third model includes both the 
macroeconomic variables and the investor sentiment variable. All explanatory variables have 
been standardized before the regressions have been run. All models are run using maximum 
likelihood and a constant included. The logit function is𝑓(𝑥) =
𝑒𝑥
1+𝑒𝑥
. 
 
 Pr(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡) = 1
= 𝑓(𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡) 
 
(5) 
 Pr(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡) = 1 = 𝑓(𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡) 
 
(6) 
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 Pr(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡) = 1
= 𝑓(𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡) 
(7) 
 
The 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the volatility index for country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 the interest rate, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 the one-
year return, 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 the price-earnings ratio, 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 the inflation rate, 𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 the purer 
measure of investor sentiment calculated as in Equation (4), 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy 
variable equal to zero during a non-crisis period and to one during a crisis period, 
1𝑀⁡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the one month lag of the one month return. 
 
3.4.2 OLS ON WHOLE PERIODS, DUMMY VARIABLE INCLUDED 
OLS is run for each country during the whole time period, from 2000 to 2014, consisting of 
up to 180 monthly observations per country. The time series length give the possibility of 
including independent variables other than the investor sentiment variable, measured as the 
Consumer Confidence Index, and the lag of the investor sentiment variable. All 
macroeconomic variables previously mentioned can be included but it is also possible to 
include the dummy variables coded depending on whether a crisis period is present or not. 
Since the dependent variable, the one month return, suffers from autocorrelation, the lag of 
the one month return is included as an independent variable. HAC standard errors are also 
used when running these regressions in order to deal with the autocorrelation. The HAC 
standard errors are robust standard errors for OLS which deal with autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity (Newey & West, 1987). Equation (8) is the most extensive OLS model run 
on the whole time period 2000-2014 for each country. By removing several of the variables 
various variations of the model are run as well.  
 
 1𝑀⁡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽91𝑀⁡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(8) 
 
3.4.3 OLS ON DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS 
OLS is also run separately for each type of period (crisis/non-crisis) and for each country. 
This is done in order to check for any differences in the effect of the investor sentiment 
variable depending on whether a crisis is present or not. So for a country which suffers from 
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two crises and have two non-crises periods there are four periods in total. For all these four 
periods six OLS regressions will be run. The dependent variable is the monthly return on 
stock price indices for the various countries. Since the number of months in this case might be 
limited down to 25 months at some points, the numbers of independent variables have to be 
limited as compared to when running the regressions on the whole time sample period. If to 
many variables are included for a short time sample, there are too few degrees of freedom and 
problems may arise. The independent variables have been limited to be maximum three, the 
purer measure of investor sentiment, one lag of this purer sentiment measure and one lag of 
the dependent variable one month return. In order to deal with the problem of autocorrelation 
in the dependent variable, the one month return a lag of this variable is included. Robust HAC 
standard errors are also used when running these regressions. For each type of period for each 
country the following similar six regressions are estimated. Equation (14) is the most 
extensive one, including all three possible independent variables. 
 
 1𝑀⁡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (9) 
 1𝑀⁡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑀⁡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (10) 
 1𝑀⁡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (11) 
 1𝑀⁡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽21𝑀⁡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (12) 
 1𝑀⁡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +⁡𝛽2𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (13) 
 1𝑀⁡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +⁡𝛽2𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽31𝑀⁡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(14) 
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4 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
In this section the main empirical findings will be presented and commented. Due to space 
limitations only the main results will be presented in this section while tables of all other 
empirical findings can be found in the appendix. As previously mentioned, three different 
types of models have been estimated. Subsections concentrating on these three models 
separately will follow. 
 
4.1 LOGIT MODEL 
Only the most extensive logit model (“Logit Model 3”), with all macroeconomic variables as 
well as the investor sentiment variable, will due to space limitations be presented in this 
section, see TABLE 3 for these results (see the appendix for results from the two other logit 
models run). This larger logit model tends to have a higher McFadden R
2 
value than the other 
smaller models for all countries. The values of the McFadden R
2
 vary from 4 percent to 73 
percent across countries for the most extensive logit model. The likelihood ratio probabilities 
for Logit Model 3 indicate for all countries that the joint null hypothesis that all coefficients, 
apart from the constants, are zero can be rejected. Hence, these statistics and probabilities are 
not presented. Also the variables that are statistically significantly different from zero and 
hence have an effect on the dependent binary variable consisting of crisis codes, differs 
among countries. This part will explain these differences and analyze the major patterns in the 
regression results. 
The most interesting variable is without a doubt the investor sentiment variable (called 
PURERSENT in the table). There is no consistency in the statistical significance of this 
variable across countries. The variable is proved to have statistical significance for several 
countries but none for others. In France, Germany, United Kingdom and in the United States 
the investor sentiment variables are significantly positive. The positive sign indicates that the 
investor sentiment has the expected effect on stock market crises. The value of the investor 
sentiment is thus making a difference in explaining the probability of stock market crises to 
occur in the countries mentioned, if the investor sentiment increases the probability of a stock 
market crisis to occur also increases. Schmeling (2009) finds that the relationship between 
investor sentiment and stock market returns differs across countries and that the institutional 
quality and cultural factors play a role in explaining stock markets returns. These factors 
might be one reason why the results in this thesis differ among countries also for stock market 
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crises. For further research it would therefore be of interest to incorporate such factors when 
estimating the relationship between investor sentiment and stock market crises as well. 
Zouaoui, Nouyrigat and Beer (2011) argue that investor sentiment is an indicator of stock 
market crises while neither Baur, Quintero and Stevens (1996) nor Siegel (1992) found 
evidence that investor sentiment was an indicator of the 1987 stock market crash in the United 
States. The different in methods applied is most probable the explanation of these differences 
in results.  
The coefficients for the volatility variables, VIX and VSTOXX, are never significant for 
any of the countries looked upon. Also Zouaoui, Nouyrigat and Beer (2011) find that VIX 
have no statistical significance in explaining stock market crises. These findings contradict the 
underlying theory of why to include these risk aversion variables as proposed by Coudert and 
Gex (2008). Coudert and Gex (2008) claim that VIX have a positive effect on the probability 
of stock market crises to occur. Zouaoui, Nouyrigat, and Beer (2011) use the VIX both for the 
American and the European market. The findings of this thesis show that it makes no 
difference in results when using the VSTOXX for the European market. According to the 
findings of this study neither of the two volatility indices seem to have a role in explaining the 
stock market crises. Thus, investor sentiment can be claimed to be a better predictor of stock 
market crises than VIX and VSTOXX. 
The interest rate (INT) is never significant for the European countries but for the United 
States it is negatively significant and thus has a negative relation on the probability of stock 
market crises to occur. Also Zouaoui, Nouyrigat and Beer (2011) find that the interest rate has 
a negative effect on the probability of a stock market crisis to occur. Thus, during a period 
with a relative higher interest rate the probability of a stock market crisis to occur in the 
United States is higher. Interest rates tend to decline before a stock market crisis (Coudert and 
Gex, 2008), and thus if the interest rate is at a relatively high level, the probability of it getting 
lower is higher and thus also the probability of a stock market crises. For the European 
countries the conclusion that the interest rate is a good indicator of stock market crises to 
occur cannot be drawn, since none of the coefficients for the interest rate are statistically 
significant. 
The variables of one-year stock return (RET) are statistically significant different from 
zero for all countries. The effect is strongly significantly negative on crises no matter the 
country looked upon. This relationship is logic since if the one-year returns are high it means 
that the price index have been improving during the last year, and hence according to mean 
reversion theory, the probability of a drop back in price should increase. Also both Coudert 
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and Gex (2008) and Zouaoui, Nouyrigat and Beer (2011) find the year-on-year changes in 
stock prices have a negative effect on the probability of a stock market crisis to occur.  
The price-earnings ratio (PER) has a negative effect in Spain while it does not have a 
statistically significantly effect on stock market crises for any of the other countries. In Spain, 
the effect of the price-earnings ratio is negative on the probability of stock market crises. An 
increase in the stock valuation, measured as the price-earnings ratio, decrease the probability 
of a stock market crisis to occur. This finding is inconsistent with the underlying theory by 
Coudert and Gex (2008) showing that a high price-earnings ratio tends to increase the 
probability of a stock market crisis to occur.  
The inflation (INF) is positively significant in the United States but cannot be proved to be 
statistically different from zero in any of the European countries. This finding in the United 
States is comprehensive with underlying economic theory. Several studies, including Pearce 
(1982), Fama and Schwert (1977), and Bordo and Wheelock (1998) show that the relation 
between stock market returns and the inflation rate is negative. Central banks try to hold the 
inflation rate at a steady level in order to make the society know what to expect of future price 
levels. Hence, the positive inflation variable indicates that an unstable and fluctuating 
inflation rate has an effect on the probability of a stock market crises.  
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TABLE 3: ALL COUNTRIES, LOGIT MODEL 3, 2000-2014 
Independent var. BELGIUM DENMARK FRANCE GERMANY ITALY SPAIN SWEDEN UNITED 
KINGDOM 
UNITED STATES 
C -1.4561*** 
[-7.0733] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.2277 
[-1.2534] 
(0.2101) 
 
-0.2886 
[-1.3468] 
(0.1780) 
 
-0.4702** 
[-2.3055] 
(0.0211) 
 
-1.4258*** 
[-6.9927] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.3806** 
[-2.1337] 
(0.0329) 
 
-1.4200*** 
[-6.7488] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2327 
[0.9040] 
(0.3660) 
 
1.7239** 
[2.5582] 
(0.0105) 
 
VSTOXX/VIX 0.0825 
[0.4329] 
(0.6651) 
 
0.0369 
[0.1988] 
(0.8424) 
 
0.0195 
[0.0902] 
(0.9281) 
 
0.0747 
[0.4069] 
(0.6841) 
 
0.0806 
[0.4343] 
(0.6640) 
 
0.0802 
[0.4616] 
(0.6444) 
 
0.0402 
[0.2178] 
(0.8276) 
 
0.0875 
[0.3556] 
(0.7222) 
 
0.4003 
[0.7753] 
(0.4382) 
 
INT 0.0706 
[0.3388] 
(0.7348) 
 
0.2746 
[1.3112] 
(0.1898) 
 
0.2392 
[1.0047] 
(0.3151) 
 
0.1353 
[0.6124] 
(0.5402) 
 
0.1441 
[0.6468] 
(0.5178) 
 
0.0379 
[0.1882] 
(0.8507) 
 
0.3370 
[1.3017] 
(0.1930) 
 
0.4764 
[1.5801] 
(0.1141) 
 
-4.9962*** 
[-3.6908] 
(0.0002) 
 
RET -0.5189** 
[-2.2347] 
(0.0254) 
 
-1.0675*** 
[-3.9995] 
(0.0001) 
 
-1.3332*** 
[-4.6680] 
(0.0000) 
 
-1.4443*** 
[-5.2993] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.4940** 
[-2.0252] 
(0.0428) 
 
-0.7291*** 
[-3.4238] 
(0.0006) 
 
-0.8146*** 
[-2.9680] 
(0.0030) 
 
-3.0062*** 
[-5.8581] 
(0.0000) 
 
-6.3157*** 
[-4.3220] 
(0.0000) 
 
PER -0.1672 
[-0.7204] 
(0.4713) 
 
0.0711 
[0.4144] 
(0.6786) 
 
-0.1761 
[-0.8222] 
(0.4109) 
 
-0.2213 
[-0.9861] 
(0.3241) 
 
-0.1968 
[-0.9697] 
(0.3322) 
 
-0.4325** 
[-2.2479] 
(0.0246) 
 
-0.0606 
[-0.3064] 
(0.7593) 
 
0.2209 
[0.8162] 
(0.4144) 
 
0.1512 
[0.3475] 
(0.7282) 
 
INF 0.1041 
[0.5190] 
(0.6038) 
 
0.0506 
[0.2780] 
(0.7810) 
 
0.1983 
[0.9486] 
(0.3428) 
 
0.0151 
[0.0824] 
(0.9343) 
 
0.0136 
[0.0718] 
(0.9428) 
 
0.0123 
[0.0679] 
(0.9458) 
 
0.0076 
[0.0354] 
(0.9718) 
 
0.1232 
[0.5881] 
(0.5565) 
 
1.3700*** 
[2.8492] 
(0.0044) 
 
PURERSENT -0.0061 
[-0.0293] 
(0.9767) 
 
-0.1549 
[-0.6824] 
(0.4950) 
 
1.6547*** 
[5.7477] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6927*** 
[2.9151] 
(0.0036) 
 
-0.2498 
[-1.2921] 
(0.1963) 
 
-0.0915 
[-0.4948] 
(0.6207) 
 
0.3235 
[1.3201] 
(0.1868) 
 
0.7271*** 
[3.3091] 
(0.0009) 
 
3.5180*** 
[4.4930] 
(0.0000) 
 
McFadden R2 0.0462 0.1498 
 
0.3434 
 
0.2121 
 
0.0472 
 
0.1240 
 
0.0737 
 
0.4462 
 
0.7335 
 
The dependent variable for all logit models are the binary crisis codes. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Coefficients are followed by z-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the 
significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. VSTOXX is the variable for all the European countries while VIX is the variable used for the United States. 
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4.2 OLS ON WHOLE PERIODS, DUMMY VARIABLE INCLUDED 
The dependent variable in this model is the one month return. When looking at the OLS 
models which have been run for the whole time sample 2000-2014, the output show that the 
highest adjusted R
2
 for most countries occur for the models with all potential explanatory 
variables included. Hence, only these results will be presented in this section, see TABLE 4 
for these results. The adjusted R
2
 values for this extensive model are for all countries in 
between 39 percent and 82 percent. See the appendix for output from all other smaller models 
run, sorted with respect to countries. Note that all coefficients have been scaled in order to 
make them comparable across countries. 
The most interesting variables to look at are the behavioral finance variables. Interestingly, 
the first behavioral finance variable included, representing investor sentiment is positively 
statistically significant for France and for the United Kingdom but only so at the 10 percent 
significance level. Investor sentiment affects monthly stock market returns positively for these 
two countries. For all other countries included in the sample no such relation can be proven to 
exist. Thus, the evidence that the investor sentiment affect stock market returns lack in 
uniformity across countries. Previously, several papers (see for example Brown & Cliff, 2005 
and Bathia & Bredin, 2013) have found that there is a negative relationship between investor 
sentiment and stock market prices. This means that a high level of investor sentiment tends to 
provide lower future stock returns (Bathia & Bredin, 2013). Investor sentiment is thus seen as 
a contrarian indicator of stock market returns. Thus surprisingly, the effects on stock market 
returns on investor sentiment are positively for France and the United Kingdom in the OLS 
model estimated in this thesis. However, that the results are only true for two out of nine 
countries and only at the ten percent significance level indicates that the effect of these results 
should not be exaggerated. 
The one month lagged investor sentiment variable show a negative sign and is significant 
for France, Belgium and Germany. This means that the last month’s investor sentiment value 
has an negative effect on today’s stock market returns. This is reasonable and consistent with 
previous findings indicating that the investor sentiment can be used as a contrarian indicator 
of stock market returns. 
The binary crisis codes are negatively significant for Belgium and Sweden only. That the 
coefficients for the dummy variables are negative indicate that during stock market crises 
stock market returns will be more negatively affected than during non-crisis periods in these 
countries. These findings seem reasonable as it seems intuitive for stock market returns to be 
lower during stock market crises as compared to non-crisis periods. Despite this, no such 
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relationship can be proven for the countries other than Belgium and Sweden, since the crisis 
codes in these other countries show no statistical significance. 
Among the traditional macroeconomic variables, several variables are statistically 
significantly different from zero. The volatility variable VSTOXX shows the expected 
negative sign and is statistically significantly different from zero for all European countries, 
while the corresponding VIX is not significantly different from zero for the United States. The 
negative relationship between changes in the VSTOXX index and stock market returns 
indicate that when the volatility index increase stock market returns decrease, ceteris paribus. 
During times of a raised instability and high price movements, stock market returns seem to 
be lower than during more stable times. The interest rate (INT) is only significant for France 
(positive), Sweden (negative) and the United Kingdom (negative) and shows different signs, 
and thus it is ambiguous whether changes in the interest rates affect stock market returns or 
not, even though it seem to do so in specific countries. Hence, an inverse relationship between 
stock market returns and interest rate yields is hard to prove. 
The one-year return (RET) and the price-earnings ratio (PER) are both positively 
statistically significantly and thus affecting the dependent variable for all countries included 
in the sample. That the effect of the one-year return is positive, means that if a stock has risen 
during the last year, then it has a positive effect on current stock market return. The stock 
market returns seem to depend on this momentum. Similarly, if the price-earnings ratio is at 
relatively high levels then the stock market returns tend to be high, and that is the probable 
reason for the countries to be valuated at high levels. This contradicts the mean-reversion 
theory suggesting that stocks or stock markets that are highly valued according to the price-
earnings ratio should examine negative returns in order to make the price-earnings ratio move 
against a long-term mean (Campbell & Schiller, 2001). 
Inflation (INF) is only significant for Belgium (negative), Denmark (positive), and the 
United Kingdom (positive) and show different signs for the countries. So the price level in a 
country seems to affect stock market returns differently depending on country. When positive, 
a higher inflation rate has a positive effect on stock market returns. If the price level goes up, 
then stock market returns go up, this seems intuitively. The contrary effect is harder to explain 
with economic arguments.  
The lagged one month return is negatively significant for all countries except Germany 
and the United States while the constants not are significant for any country. That the 
coefficients for the lag of the dependent variable is negatively significant indicate a reversion 
in stock market prices towards a long term equilibrium value.  
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TABLE 4: ALL COUNTRIES, OLS, 2000-2014 
Independent var. BELGIUM DENMARK FRANCE GERMANY ITALY SPAIN SWEDEN UNITED KINGDOM UNITED STATES 
PURERSENT 0.1965 
[1.5987] 
(0.1119) 
 
0.0314 
[0.3451] 
(0.7305) 
 
0.1751* 
[1.7328] 
(0.0853) 
 
0.2221 
[1.6327] 
(0.1047) 
 
0.0818 
[0.6058] 
(0.5455) 
 
0.0491 
[0.3141] 
(0.7539) 
 
-0.0320 
[-0.2230] 
(0.8239) 
 
0.1593* 
[1.7650] 
(0.0797) 
 
0.0572 
[0.5230] 
(0.6018) 
 
PURERSENT(-1) -0.2281* 
[-1.7775] 
(0.0774) 
 
-0.0463 
[-0.3717] 
(0.7106) 
 
-0.2004* 
[-1.7100] 
(0.0894) 
 
-0.2477* 
[-1.7883] 
(0.0758) 
 
-0.1547 
[-1.0118] 
(0.3132) 
 
-0.0588 
[-0.4019] 
(0.6883) 
 
-0.1456 
[-0.9860] 
(0.3256) 
 
-0.1222 
[-1.4079] 
(0.1613) 
 
-0.0544 
[-0.5615] 
(0.5754) 
 
CRISIS CODE -0.1122** 
[-2.0231] 
(0.0447) 
 
-0.0660 
[-0.8468] 
(0.3985) 
 
-0.0881 
[-1.4264] 
(0.1559) 
 
-0.0656 
[-0.9770] 
(0.3302) 
 
-0.0761 
[-1.5619] 
(0.1203) 
 
0.0474 
[0.8580] 
(0.3923) 
 
-0.1310* 
[-1.6833] 
(0.0943) 
 
-0.0083 
[-0.1544] 
(0.8775) 
 
0.0107 
[0.2672] 
(0.7897) 
 
1M RET.(-1) -0.1476** 
[-2.3388] 
(0.0206) 
 
-0.2662*** 
[-4.4507] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.1960*** 
[-3.3857] 
(0.0009) 
 
-0.1038 
[-1.0859] 
(0.2793) 
 
-0.2147*** 
[-3.9411] 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.1350* 
[-1.8564] 
(0.0654) 
 
-0.2045*** 
[-3.1334] 
(0.0021) 
 
-0.2570*** 
[-3.8708] 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0708 
[-1.2325] 
(0.2198) 
 
C 0.0031 
[0.7595] 
(0.4487) 
 
-0.0036 
[-0.4818] 
(0.6307) 
 
0.0021 
[0.5366] 
(0.5924) 
 
0.0013 
[0.3089] 
(0.7578) 
 
-0.0010 
[-0.2739] 
(0.7845) 
 
-0.0036 
[-0.7414] 
(0.4596) 
 
0.0019 
[0.3723] 
(0.7102) 
 
-0.0017 
[-0.5383] 
(0.5912) 
 
-0.0006 
[-0.2527] 
(0.8008) 
 
VSTOXX -0.3107*** 
[-4.1206] 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.2875*** 
[-4.3871] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.2234*** 
[-3.1635] 
(0.0019) 
 
-0.2457*** 
[-2.7998] 
(0.0058) 
 
-0.3055*** 
[-3.9907] 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.1498* 
[-1.8043] 
(0.0732) 
 
-0.2515*** 
[-2.9502] 
(0.0037) 
 
-0.2601*** 
[-3.5484] 
(0.0005) 
 
-0.0564 
[-1.1961] 
(0.2336) 
 
INT 0.0871 
[0.9352] 
(0.3511) 
 
-0.0861 
[-1.1181] 
(0.2653) 
 
0.1505*** 
[2.7205] 
(0.0073) 
 
0.0886 
[1.3788] 
(0.1701) 
 
0.0042 
[0.0725] 
(0.9423) 
 
0.0517 
[0.7519] 
(0.4533) 
 
-0.1193* 
[-1.7199] 
(0.0874) 
 
-0.0796** 
[-2.048] 
(0.0424) 
 
0.0707 
[1.4781] 
(0.1416) 
 
RET 0.3867*** 
[3.9358] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.4384*** 
[5.3831] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2631*** 
[3.6238] 
(0.0004) 
 
0.3150*** 
[2.9190] 
(0.0041) 
 
0.3641*** 
[5.1683] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2836*** 
[3.5123] 
(0.0006) 
 
0.3752*** 
[4.4322] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4022*** 
[6.4568] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3582*** 
[5.6567] 
(0.0000) 
 
PER 0.3139*** 
[2.9551] 
(0.0036) 
 
0.3744*** 
[4.1229] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.5876*** 
[5.0239] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4978*** 
[3.6098] 
(0.0004) 
 
0.4808*** 
[5.1305] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5831*** 
[4.4861] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4358*** 
[3.0674] 
[0.0025) 
 
0.5650*** 
[6.9243] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.7629*** 
[11.977] 
(0.0000) 
 
INF -0.1091* 
[-1.9502] 
(0.0529) 
 
0.1318** 
[2.2441] 
(0.0263) 
 
0.0386 
[0.7939] 
(0.4286) 
 
-0.0247 
[-0.5087] 
(0.6117) 
 
0.0619 
[0.7615] 
(0.4475) 
 
-0.0014 
[-0.0265] 
(0.9789) 
 
0.0076 
[0.1182] 
(0.9061) 
 
0.1053* 
[1.8583] 
(0.0652) 
 
-0.0379 
[-1.0974] 
(0.2743) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.4105 
 
0.4442 
 
0.6451 
 
0.4955 
 
0.5040 
 
0.4711 
 
0.3946 
 
0.6127 
 
0.8190 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. The countries suffer from a different number of crises, see TABLE 2 for all identified crises. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-
values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. VSTOXX is the variable for all the European countries while VIX is the variable used for the United States. 
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4.3 OLS ON DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS 
Since the investor sentiment variable  and the lag of the investor sentiment variable are found 
to have a statistical significance for a couple of countries when running the regression on the 
whole time sample, it is interesting to see what these effects look like when breaking down 
and looking at different crisis-periods and non-crisis-periods apart. Are there any periods in 
which investor sentiment affect stock market returns more?  
When looking at the empirical findings, when dividing in different periods depending on if 
there is a crisis or not, the differences between countries, type of periods, and the number of 
explanatory variables included in the models are strikingly. These differences make it hard to 
draw any general conclusions, but also make the allocation into different periods relevant. The 
differences among countries and periods regard both the explanatory adjusted R
2
 values, and 
the number and sign of statistically significant variables. The highest adjusted R
2 
values vary 
across model extensions across countries. The output of the most extensive model, estimated 
as in Equation (14), can be found in TABLE 5. Results from all other less extensive models 
run can be found in the appendix. 
Remember that the explanatory variables in this type of model solely are the pure measure 
of investor sentiment, the one month lagged pure measure of the investor sentiment, and the 
lagged one month return. The dependent variable is the one month return. All regressions are 
run with a constant. The focus will be on the behavioral finance variable investor sentiment 
and the lag of the investor sentiment variable. Note that all coefficients have been scaled in 
order to make them comparable across countries. 
The behavioral finance variable, investor sentiment, seems to have different effect 
depending on the country, model extension, and time-period studied. The coefficients of the 
behavioral variables seem to have a tendency to be more statistically significant during the 
second crises period, occurring around the subprime mortgage crises starting in 2007, than 
during to the first crisis period around the dot-com bubble in the start of the 21
st
 century. 
During the second crisis period six behavioral investor sentiment coefficients are significant 
as compared to three coefficients during the first crisis period, perhaps this is something that 
could have been expected since the subprime mortgage crisis was a bigger crisis. That the 
effect of investor sentiment on stock market returns was higher during the subprime mortgage 
crisis indicate that also stock markets prices in general were more overvalued as compared to 
fundamentals during that crisis. Also, the adjusted R
2
 values are in the general higher for 
models run during the subprime crisis as compared to the dot-com bubble. Furthermore, there 
seem to be a tendency of having more significant investor sentiment variables when all 
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possible independent variables are included in the model. These models seem to have more 
explanatory value than the less extensive models. The sign of investor sentiment, are when 
statistically significantly different from zero at most times positive, while it a few times (for 
Spain and Italy) is negative. If the coefficient for the investor sentiment variable is positive 
then investor sentiment is proved to have a positive effect on stock market returns. This 
relation seems to be more profound during the subprime mortgage crisis. 
Intuitively all non-crisis periods should look alike in terms of significant variables and 
their signs. Generally the R
2
 values are very low for all non-crisis periods, this supports the 
hypothesis that non-crises should look alike. But differences in which, and how many, 
variables that are significant are present. The reason for this might be the differences in the 
number of observations making up to a non-crisis period. These small sample sizes might be 
unrepresentative of non-crisis periods in general. Also, a non-crisis period in for example 
Germany does not necessarily have to be of the same length and at the same time as a non-
crisis period in France. 
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TABLE 5: ALL COUNTRIES, OLS, SEPARATE PERIODS 
 BELGIUM DENMARK FRANCE GERMANY ITALY SPAIN SWEDEN UNITED KINGDOM UNITED STATES 
Crisis 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 
PURER- 
SENT 
0.3969 
[1.6595] 
(0.1078) 
 
-0.1160 
[-0.6573] 
(0.5155) 
 
0.7584* 
[2.0122] 
(0.0547) 
 
0.3147 
[1.4252] 
(0.1632) 
 
0.4847** 
[2.1554] 
(0.0396) 
 
0.4295 
[1.0847] 
(0.2857) 
 
0.5337* 
[1.7452] 
(0.0943) 
 
0.0402 
[0.2278] 
(0.8213) 
 
-0.6075* 
[-1.8290] 
(0.0767) 
 
-0.5369** 
[-2.2031] 
(0.0370) 
 
-0.1473 
[-0.4818] 
(0.6332) 
 
0.0239 
[0.1453] 
(0.8854) 
 
-0.2030 
[-0.8391] 
(0.4097) 
 
0.5274* 
[1.9986] 
(0.0554) 
 
-0.0082 
[-0.0121] 
(0.9904) 
 
PURER- 
SENT(-1) 
-0.1377 
[-0.6412] 
(0.5265) 
 
-0.0349 
[-0.1960] 
(0.8458) 
 
-0.2935 
[-0.6993] 
(0.4906) 
 
-0.1905 
[-0.7713] 
(0.4459) 
 
-0.2270 
[-1.0336] 
(0.3099) 
 
-0.1764 
[-0.4219] 
(0.6757) 
 
-0.1597 
[-0.4299] 
(0.6712) 
 
-0.2470 
[-0.9238] 
(0.3629) 
 
0.5700 
[1.4918] 
(0.1455) 
 
0.8216*** 
[3.4152] 
(0.0022) 
 
0.1221 
[0.3595] 
(0.7216) 
 
-0.0396 
[-0.2003] 
(0.8425) 
 
0.5799** 
[2.2135] 
(0.0366) 
 
-0.4715** 
[-2.2421] 
(0.0331) 
 
0.1621 
[0.2459] 
(0.8078) 
 
1M 
RETURN(-1) 
0.1714 
[1.0623] 
(0.2969) 
 
-0.0028 
[-0.0255] 
(0.9798) 
 
-0.1058 
[-0.7163] 
(0.4802) 
 
-0.0032 
[-0.0256] 
(0.9797) 
 
0.1990 
[1.6265] 
(0.1147) 
 
0.0632 
[0.4043] 
(0.6886) 
 
-0.0885 
[-0.5946] 
(0.5579) 
 
0.2793* 
[2.0034] 
(0.0542) 
 
0.0123 
[0.1254] 
(0.9010) 
 
0.0971 
[1.1718] 
(0.2523) 
 
0.0457 
[0.3272] 
(0.7457) 
 
-0.0600 
[-0.5033] 
(0.6182) 
 
-0.0805 
[-0.7000] 
(0.4907) 
 
-0.1603* 
[-1.9980] 
(0.0555) 
 
0.3395** 
[2.0784] 
(0.0485) 
 
C -0.0182* 
[-1.8001] 
(0.0822) 
 
-0.0096 
[-0.9541] 
(0.3470) 
 
-0.0067 
[-0.6833] 
(0.5005) 
 
-0.02084 
[-1.8760] 
(0.0693) 
 
-0.0227** 
[-2.0848] 
(0.0460) 
 
-0.0235* 
[-1.8956] 
(0.0665) 
 
-0.0225 
[-1.6417] 
(0.1142) 
 
-0.0238 
[-1.6235] 
(0.1149) 
 
-0.0175* 
[-1.9691] 
(0.0577) 
 
-0.0185*** 
[-2.8792] 
(0.0081) 
 
-0.0239** 
[-2.0899] 
(0.0447) 
 
-0.0160 
[-1.5801] 
(0.1239) 
 
-0.0130** 
[-2.1718] 
(0.0400) 
 
-0.0178 
[-0.7645] 
(0.4510) 
 
-0.0141 
[-1.4500] 
(0.1600) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0895 
 
0.0000 0.1105 0.0000 
 
0.1282 
 
0.0030 
 
0.0211 
 
0.0335 
 
0.0267 
 
0.1378 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0774 
 
0.0373 
 
0.0428 
 
Non-Crisis 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 
PURER- 
SENT 
0.5302* 
[1.9417] 
(0.0561) 
 
-0.2188 
[-1.5944] 
(0.1167) 
 
-0.2609 
[-1.0847] 
(0.2880) 
 
0.2669 
[1.1345] 
(0.2617) 
 
-0.0208 
[-0.1356] 
(0.8934) 
 
0.2180 
[0.6654] 
(0.5088) 
 
-0.1612 
[-0.4911] 
(0.6272) 
 
0.7935*** 
[2.8771] 
(0.0059) 
 
0.2623 
[0.9530] 
(0.3439) 
 
0.2312 
[0.5934] 
(0.5554) 
 
0.5672*** 
[3.2137] 
(0.0033) 
 
0.2868 
[1.4121] 
(0.1638) 
 
0.2775 
[1.2309] 
(0.2206) 
 
0.4902** 
[2.5118] 
(0.0181) 
 
0.1615 
[0.5338] 
(0.5958) 
 
0.3706** 
[2.6428] 
(0.0126) 
 
0.4138* 
[1.7039] 
(0.0945) 
 
PURER- 
SENT(-1) 
-0.6356*** 
[-2.6573] 
(0.0097) 
 
-0.0066 
[-0.0330] 
(0.9738) 
 
0.2847 
[0.9316] 
(0.3601) 
 
-0.3396 
[-1.3435] 
(0.1848) 
 
-0.2149 
[-1.0849] 
(0.2902) 
 
-0.3357 
[-1.0762] 
(0.2869) 
 
0.2345 
[1.0677] 
(0.2948) 
 
-0.7473** 
[-2.5960] 
(0.0124) 
 
-0.5190* 
[-1.8990] 
(0.0617) 
 
-0.1918 
[-0.5116] 
(0.6110) 
 
-0.5134** 
[-2.3887] 
(0.0239) 
 
-0.2174 
[-1.0604] 
(0.2938) 
 
-0.3248 
[-1.2278] 
(0.2218) 
 
-0.1568 
[-0.8449] 
(0.4053) 
 
-0.1693 
[-0.5565] 
(0.5803) 
 
-0.3056 
[-1.5817] 
(0.1236) 
 
-0.3664** 
[-2.4063] 
(0.0198) 
 
1M 
RETURN(-1) 
0.1915** 
[2.1356] 
(0.0362) 
 
-0.0399 
[-0.3362] 
(0.7380) 
 
-0.0227 
[-0.1731] 
(0.8639) 
 
-0.1287 
[-1.2771] 
(0.2071) 
 
-0.4164** 
[-2.1237] 
(0.0457) 
 
-0.0465 
[-0.2969] 
(0.7677) 
 
-0.2065 
[-1.1073] 
(0.2776) 
 
0.0808 
[0.7092] 
(0.4815) 
 
-0.1281 
[-1.3843] 
(0.1707) 
 
-0.1316 
[-1.1240] 
(0.2660) 
 
-0.1127 
[-0.5156] 
(0.6102) 
 
-0.1447 
[-1.2198] 
(0.2279) 
 
0.0075 
[0.0807] 
(0.9358) 
 
-0.5234*** 
[-3.2870] 
(0.0027) 
 
-0.2694** 
[-2.5063] 
(0.0154) 
 
-0.2580 
[-1.5810] 
(0.1237) 
 
-0.1449 
[-1.1438] 
(0.2580) 
 
C 0.0070 
[1.3492] 
(0.1816) 
 
0.0011 
[0.1438] 
(0.8862) 
 
0.0142 
[1.1737] 
(0.2512) 
 
0.0154* 
[1.9045] 
(0.0623) 
 
0.0175*** 
[2.9734] 
(0.0072) 
 
0.0018 
[0.2734] 
(0.7856) 
 
0.0217 
[1.6138] 
(0.1178) 
 
0.0044 
[0.6473] 
(0.5204) 
 
0.0071 
[1.4177] 
(0.1607) 
 
0.0025 
[0.3297] 
(0.7429) 
 
0.0160 
[1.2489] 
(0.2220) 
 
-0.0014 
[-0.1290] 
(0.8978) 
 
0.0072 
[1.4035] 
(0.1629) 
 
0.0066 
[1.2954] 
(0.2058) 
 
0.0062 
[1.3328] 
(0.1885) 
 
0.0091** 
[2.4845] 
(0.0184) 
 
0.0145*** 
[2.8575] 
(0.0062) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.1197 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0003 
 
0.1005 
 
0.0184 
 
0.0000 
 
0.2241 
 
0.0602 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0719 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0126 
 
0.2438 
 
0.0181 
 
0.0458 
 
0.0465 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014, but divided in different periods. The countries suffer from a different number of crises, see TABLE 2 for all identified crises. Coefficients are followed by t-
statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
Trying to investigate the relationship between investor sentiment and stock market crises for 
nine different countries from 2000 to 2014 a logit model and two OLS models have been 
estimated. Findings show there seem to be a positive statistically significant relationship 
between investor sentiment, measured by the Consumer Confidence Index, and stock market 
crises at times. 
The logit model regressions show that investor sentiment can help explain the probability 
of stock market crises occurring at several of the largest stock markets in the world. The 
statistically significant results of the logit model for Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States indicate that investor sentiment make a difference in explaining the 
occurrence of stock market crises. That investor sentiment help explain the probability of a 
stock market crisis occurring indicate that market psychology have an effect in explaining 
stock market prices. Excessive investor optimism might draw stock market prices to levels 
that cannot be justified by fundamentals, and thus stock market prices might be overvalued 
due to investor sentiment. For these four countries, investor sentiment seems to be a good 
predictor of when stock markets are overvalued. This provide evidence that behavioral 
finance variables should be remembered to be included when trying to explain stock market 
returns or stock market crises.  
By looking more closely at specific crisis periods the matter of understanding the effect of 
the investor sentiment can be even more elaborated. The period specific results indicate that 
investor sentiment matters more when explaining stock market returns during the subprime 
mortgage crisis than during the dot-com bubble, where the results where more vague and had 
low explanatory value. 
Certainly, there are many areas of this subject that are in need of further research. The 
investor sentiment can be measured in numerous ways and a study comparing the effects of 
different measures on stock market crises would be of interest in order to tell which measure 
that can explain stock market crises most accurate. Further, also the identification of crises 
can be done in several ways. It would be interesting to incorporate regime switching models 
in the identification process and then compare these identified crises to investor sentiment. 
The time sample and relatively few countries examined yield some obvious drawbacks to this 
thesis. Hence, to include more countries and use longer time periods in a future study would 
also be of highest relevance to make the academic research in this area progress. 
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As hypothesized, the behavioral finance aspect and psychological influenced variable, 
investor sentiment, is found to play a role in explaining stock market crises, at least for some 
countries and at certain time periods. This study contributes to the understanding of why stock 
market crises occur. At periods of high optimism in the investor sentiment assets seem to be 
overvalued since the probability of a stock market crisis to occur seems to be higher. 
Irrational noise traders thus have an effect on asset prices, while it might be hard for 
arbitrageurs trading on fundamentals only, to offset these market mispricing. 
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APPENDIX A 
Appendix A consists of the survey questions of the used Consumer Confidence Indices. 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN RESEARCH CENTER, INDEX OF CONSUMER SENTIMENT. 
The index of Consumer Sentiment is derived from the following five questions. The relative scores on each 
question is calculated by measuring the percent giving favourable replies minus the percent giving unfavourable 
replies, plus 100. Then the relative replies on each question is summed up and divided by the total value at the 
base period in 1966, that is 6.7558, and a constant of 2 added. 
 
Q1. “We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say that you (and your 
family living there) are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago?" 
1. Better now 
3. Same 
5. Worse 
8. Don’t Know 
 
Q2. “Now looking ahead--do you think that a year from now you (and your family living there) will be better off 
financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now?" 
1. Will be better off 
3. Same 
5. Will be worse off 
8. Don’t Know 
 
Q3. "Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole--do you think that during the next twelve 
months we'll have good times financially, or bad times, or what?" 
1. Good times 
2. Good with qualifications 
3. Pro-con 
4. Bad with qualifications 
5. Bad times 
8. Don’t Know 
 
Q4. "Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely--that in the country as a whole we'll have continuous 
good times during the next five years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment or 
depression, or what?" 
 
IF R ANSWERS IN COMPARATIVE TERMS, I.E., “BETTER,” “WORSE,” OR “SAME,” PROBE: “Would 
that be good times or bad times?” 
 
Q5. "About the big things people buy for their homes--such as furniture, a refrigerator, stove, television, and 
things like that. Generally speaking, do you think now is a good or bad time for people to buy major household 
items?" 
1. Good 
3. Pro-con 
5. Bad 
8. Don’t know 
 
 
  
  
EUROPEAN COMMISSION CONSUMER CONFIDENCE INDEX 
The Consumer Confidence Indices for European countries are made up from the answers on the following 
queries. The Consumer Confidence Index is calculated through the average of the four questions, Confidence 
Indicator (Q2 + Q4 - Q7 + Q11) / 4. The respondents can choose among several alternatives per question. 
 
Q2. How do you expect the financial position of your household to change over the next 12 months? It will… 
01. Get a lot better 
02. Get a little better 
03. Stay the same 
04. Get a little worse 
05. Get a lot worse 
DK. Don’t Know 
 
Q4. How do you expect the general economic situation in this country to develop over the next 12 months? It 
will … 
01. Get a lot better 
02. Get a little better 
03. Stay the same 
04. Get a little worse 
05. Get a lot worse 
DK. Don’t Know 
 
Q7. How do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country will change over the next 12 months? 
The number will … 
01. Increase sharply 
02. Increase slightly 
03. Remain the same 
04. Fall slightly 
05. Fall sharply 
DK. Don’t Know 
 
Q11. Over the next 12 months, how likely will you be to save any money? 
01. Very likely 
02. Fairly likely 
03. Not likely 
04. Not at all likely 
DK. Don’t know 
  
  
APPENDIX B 
Appendix B consists of  all output tables, numbered from A1-A27, sorted with respect to 
countries. 
 
 
TABLE A1: BELGIUM, LOGIT MODELS 
Independent variables Logit Model 1 Logit Model 2 Logit Model 3 
C -1.4565*** 
[-7.0955] 
(0.0000) 
 
-1.3780*** 
[-7.1693] 
(0.0000) 
 
-1.4561*** 
[-7.0733] 
  (0.0000) 
 
VSTOXX 0.0826 
[0.4335] 
(0.6647) 
 
 0.0825 
[0.4329] 
(0.6651) 
 
INT 0.0686 
[0.3484] 
(0.7276) 
 
 0.0706 
[0.3388] 
(0.7348) 
 
RET -0.5189** 
[-2.2338] 
(0.0255) 
 
 -0.5189** 
[-2.2347] 
(0.0254) 
 
PER -0.1669 
[-0.7196] 
(0.4718) 
 
 
 -0.1672 
[-0.7204] 
(0.4713) 
 
INF 0.1043 
[0.5203] 
(0.6029) 
 0.1041 
[0.5190] 
(0.6038) 
 
PURERSENT  -0.0153 
[-0.0787] 
(0.9373) 
 
-0.0061 
[-0.0293] 
(0.9767) 
 
McFadden R2 0.046240 0.0000 0.0462 
The dependent variable for all logit models is the binary time series of crisis codes. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Belgium 
suffers from one crisis during this period. Coefficients are followed by z-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate 
the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
  
  
TABLE A2: DENMARK, LOGIT MODELS 
Independent variables Logit Model 1 Logit Model 2 Logit Model 3 
C -0.2457 
[-1.3692] 
(0.1710) 
 
-0.2117 
[-1.2663] 
(0.2054) 
 
-0.2277 
[-1.2534] 
(0.2101) 
 
VSTOXX 0.0282 
[0.1524] 
(0.8789) 
 
 0.0369 
[0.1988] 
(0.8424) 
 
INT 0.2604 
[1.2482] 
(0.2120) 
 
 0.2746 
[1.3112] 
(0.1898) 
 
RET -1.1490*** 
[-4.7508] 
(0.0000) 
 
 -1.0675*** 
[-3.9995] 
(0.0001) 
 
PER 0.0765 
[0.4440] 
(0.6571) 
 
 0.0711 
[0.4144] 
(0.6786) 
 
INF 0.0600 
[0.3321] 
(0.7398) 
 
 0.0506 
[0.2780] 
(0.7810) 
 
PURERSENT  -0.5831*** 
[-3.2960] 
(0.0010) 
 
-0.1549 
[-0.6824] 
(0.4950) 
 
McFadden R2 0.1477 
 
0.0557 
 
0.1498 
 
The dependent variable for all logit models is the binary time series of the crisis codes. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. 
Denmark suffers from two crises during this period. Coefficients are followed by z-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. 
***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A3: FRANCE, LOGIT MODELS 
Independent variables Logit Model 1 Logit Model 2 Logit Model 3 
C -0.1616 
[-0.9442] 
(0.3451) 
 
-0.2471 
[-1.3412] 
(0.1799) 
 
-0.2886 
[-1.3468] 
(0.1780) 
 
VSTOXX 0.0360 
[0.2092] 
(0.8343) 
 
 0.0195 
[0.0902] 
(0.9281) 
 
INT 0.2951 
[1.4693] 
(0.1418) 
 
 0.2392 
[1.0047] 
(0.3151) 
 
RET -0.8580*** 
[-3.8331] 
(0.0001) 
 -1.3332*** 
[-4.6680] 
(0.0000) 
 
PER -0.1714 
[-0.9417] 
(0.3464) 
 
 -0.1761 
[-0.8222] 
(0.4109) 
 
INF -0.0188 
[-0.1127] 
(0.9103) 
 
 0.1983 
[0.9486] 
(0.3428) 
 
PURERSENT  1.2176*** 
[5.1876] 
(0.0000) 
 
1.6547*** 
[5.7477] 
(0.0000) 
 
McFadden R2 0.0913 
 
0.1800 
 
0.3434 
 
The dependent variable for all logit models is the binary time series of the crisis codes. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. France 
suffers from two crisis during this period. Coefficients are followed by z-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate 
the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A4: GERMANY, LOGIT MODELS 
Independent variables Logit Model 1 Logit Model 2 Logit Model 3 
C -0.3340* 
[-1.8419] 
(0.0655) 
 
-0.2878* 
[-1.7409] 
(0.0817) 
 
-0.4702** 
[-2.3055] 
  (0.0211) 
 
VSTOXX 0.0612 
[0.3412] 
(0.7330) 
 
 0.0747 
[0.4069] 
(0.6841) 
 
INT 0.2396 
[1.1268] 
(0.2598) 
 
 0.1353 
[0.6124] 
(0.5402) 
 
RET -1.2007*** 
[-4.7858] 
(0.0000) 
 
 -1.4443*** 
[-5.2993] 
(0.0000) 
 
PER -0.1651 
[-0.7706] 
(0.4410) 
 
 -0.2213 
[-0.9861] 
(0.3241) 
 
INF 0.0141 
[0.0785] 
(0.9374) 
 
 0.0151 
[0.0824] 
(0.9343) 
 
PURERSENT  0.0869 
[0.4936] 
(0.6216) 
 
0.6927*** 
[2.9151] 
(0.0036) 
 
McFadden R2 0.1636 
 
0.0012 
 
0.2121 
 
The dependent variable for all logit models is the binary time series of the crisis codes. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. 
Germany suffers from two crises during this period. Coefficients are followed by z-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. 
***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A5: ITALY, LOGIT MODELS 
Independent variables Logit Model 1 Logit Model 2 Logit Model 3 
C -1.4052*** 
[-7.0050] 
(0.0000) 
 
-1.3651*** 
[-7.0545] 
(0.0000) 
 
-1.4258*** 
[-6.9927] 
(0.0000) 
 
VSTOXX 0.0861 
[0.4684] 
(0.6395) 
 
 0.0806 
[0.4343] 
(0.6640) 
 
INT 0.2027 
[0.9199] 
(0.3576) 
 
 0.1441 
[0.6468] 
(0.5178) 
 
RET -0.5052** 
[-2.1136] 
(0.0346) 
 
 -0.4940** 
[-2.0252] 
(0.0428) 
 
PER -0.1807 
[-0.9057] 
(0.3651) 
 
 -0.1968 
[-0.9697] 
(0.3322) 
 
INF 0.0072 
[0.0379] 
(0.9698) 
 
 0.0136 
[0.0718] 
(0.9428) 
 
PURERSENT  -0.2613 
[-1.3402] 
(0.1802) 
 
-0.2498 
[-1.2921] 
(0.1963) 
 
McFadden R2 0.0372 
 
0.0108 
 
0.0472 
 
The dependent variable for all logit models is the binary time series of the crisis codes. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Italy 
suffers from one crisis during this period. Coefficients are followed by z-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate 
the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A6: SPAIN, LOGIT MODELS 
Independent variables Logit Model 1 Logit Model 2 Logit Model 3 
C -0.3866** 
[-2.1717] 
(0.0299) 
 
-0.2954* 
[-1.8246] 
(0.0681) 
 
-0.3806** 
[-2.1337] 
(0.0329) 
 
VSTOXX 0.0848 
[0.4894] 
(0.6245) 
 
 0.0802 
[0.4616] 
(0.6444) 
 
INT 0.0160 
[0.0820] 
(0.9347) 
 
 0.0379 
[0.1882] 
(0.8507) 
 
RET -0.7409*** 
[-3.5009] 
(0.0005) 
 
 -0.7291*** 
[-3.4238] 
(0.0006) 
 
PER -0.424860** 
[-2.2197] 
(0.0264) 
 
 -0.4325** 
[-2.2479] 
(0.0246) 
 
INF 0.0139 
[0.0771] 
(0.9386) 
 
 0.0123 
[0.0679] 
(0.9458) 
 
PURERSENT  -0.2025 
[-1.2238] 
(0.2210) 
 
-0.0915 
[-0.4948] 
(0.6207) 
 
McFadden R2 0.1228 
 
0.0071 
 
0.1240 
 
The dependent variable for all logit models is the binary time series of the crisis codes. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Spain 
suffers from two crises during this period. Coefficients are followed by z-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* 
indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A7: SWEDEN, LOGIT MODELS 
Independent variables Logit Model 1 Logit Model 2 Logit Model 3 
C -1.3838*** 
[-6.7804] 
(0.0000) 
-1.2706*** 
[-6.8273] 
(0.0000) 
 
-1.4200*** 
[-6.7488] 
(0.0000) 
 
VSTOXX 0.0452 
[0.2428] 
(0.8081) 
 
 0.0402 
[0.2178] 
(0.8276) 
 
INT 0.3812 
[1.4535] 
(0.1461) 
 
 0.3370 
[1.3017] 
(0.1930) 
 
RET -0.6189*** 
[-2.8123] 
(0.0049) 
 
 -0.8146*** 
[-2.9680] 
(0.0030) 
 
PER -0.0802 
[-0.4168] 
(0.6768) 
 
 -0.0606 
[-0.3064] 
(0.7593) 
 
INF 0.0211 
[0.0983] 
(0.9217) 
 
 0.0076 
[0.0354] 
(0.9718) 
 
PURERSENT  -0.0324 
[-0.1749] 
(0.8612) 
 
0.3235 
[1.3201] 
(0.1868) 
 
McFadden R2 0.0636 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0737 
 
The dependent variable for all logit models is the binary time series of the crisis codes. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Sweden 
suffers from one crisis during this period. Coefficients are followed by z-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate 
the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A8: UNITED KINGDOM, LOGIT MODELS 
Independent variables Logit Model 1 Logit Model 2 Logit Model 3 
C -0.2275 
[-1.0496] 
(0.2939) 
 
-0.3147* 
[-1.9092] 
(0.0562) 
 
0.2327 
[0.9040] 
(0.3660) 
 
VSTOXX 0.0748 
[0.3422] 
(0.7322) 
 
 0.0875 
[0.3556] 
(0.7222) 
 
INT 0.2565 
[1.0254] 
(0.3052) 
 
 0.4764 
[1.5801] 
(0.1141) 
 
RET -2.4181*** 
[-6.0770] 
(0.0000) 
 
 -3.0062*** 
[-5.8581] 
(0.0000) 
 
PER -0.0187 
[-0.0838] 
(0.9333) 
 
 0.2209 
[0.8162] 
(0.4144) 
 
INF 0.0519 
[0.2596] 
(0.7951) 
 
 0.1232 
[0.5881] 
(0.5565) 
 
PURERSENT  0.2984* 
[1.8621] 
(0.0626) 
 
0.7271*** 
[3.3091] 
(0.0009) 
 
McFadden R2 0.3695 
 
0.0170 
 
0.4462 
 
The dependent variable for all logit models is the binary time series of the crisis codes. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. The 
United Kingdom suffers from two crises during this period. Coefficients are followed by z-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. 
***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
 
  
  
TABLE A9: UNITED STATES, LOGIT MODELS 
Independent variables Logit Model 1 Logit Model 2 Logit Model 3 
C 0.1224 
[0.4180] 
(0.6760) 
 
-0.5151*** 
[-2.8530] 
(0.0043) 
 
1.7239** 
[2.5582] 
(0.0105) 
 
VIX 0.1607 
[0.5994] 
(0.5489) 
 
 0.4003 
[0.7753] 
(0.4382) 
 
INT -1.3430*** 
[-2.9098] 
(0.0036) 
 
 -4.9962*** 
[-3.6908] 
(0.0002) 
 
RET -2.2571*** 
[-4.5620] 
(0.0000) 
 
 -6.3157*** 
[-4.3220] 
(0.0000) 
 
PER -0.1931 
[-0.6957] 
(0.4866) 
 
 0.1512 
[0.3475] 
(0.7282) 
 
INF 0.4178 
[1.5008] 
(0.1334) 
 
 1.3700*** 
[2.8492] 
(0.0044) 
 
PURERSENT  0.8227*** 
[4.1777] 
(0.0000) 
 
3.5180*** 
[4.4930] 
(0.0000) 
 
McFadden R2 0.4382 
 
0.1023 
 
0.7335 
 
The dependent variable for all logit models is the binary time series of the crisis codes. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. The 
United States suffers from two crises during this period. Coefficients are followed by z-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. 
***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
  
TABLE A10: BELGIUM, OLS, 2000-2014 
Independent var.             
PURERSENT -0.0623 
[-1.0313] 
(0.3038) 
 
-0.0527 
[-0.8899] 
(0.3748) 
 
  0.1914 
[1.5483] 
(0.1234) 
 
0.1983 
[1.6271] 
(0.1056) 
 
-0.0157 
[-0.2919] 
(0.7708) 
 
-0.0027 
[-0.0502] 
(0.9600) 
 
  0.1802 
[1.4272] 
(0.1555) 
 
0.1965 
[1.5987] 
(0.1119) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)   -0.1128 
[-2.3570] 
(0.1140) 
 
-0.1164 
[-1.6405] 
(0.1027) 
 
-0.2763** 
[-2.0176] 
(0.0452) 
 
-0.2865** 
[-2.1446] 
(0.0334) 
 
  -0.0568 
[-0.9427] 
(0.3473) 
 
-0.0614 
[-0.9952] 
(0.3211) 
 
-0.2094 
[-1.5924] 
(0.1133) 
 
-0.2281* 
[-1.7775] 
(0.0774) 
 
CRISIS CODE       -0.0922* 
[-1.8535] 
(0.0656) 
 
-0.1129** 
[-2.0713] 
(0.0399) 
 
-0.1007* 
[-1.9256] 
(0.0559) 
 
-0.1128** 
[-2.0186] 
(0.0452) 
 
-0.0995* 
[-1.9238] 
(0.0562) 
 
-0.1122** 
[-2.0231] 
(0.0447) 
 
1M RET.(-1)  -0.0362 
[-0.5113] 
(0.6098) 
 -0.0463 
[-0.7061] 
(0.4811) 
 
 -0.0548 
[-0.8842] 
(0.3778) 
 
 -0.1358* 
[-1.9055] 
(0.0585) 
 
 -0.1390** 
[-2.0309] 
(0.0439) 
 
 -0.1476** 
[-2.3388] 
(0.0206) 
 
C 0.0036 
[0.9330] 
(0.3521) 
 
0.0040 
[0.9855] 
(0.3258) 
 
0.0039 
[0.9985] 
(0.3194) 
 
0.0039 
[0.9518] 
(0.3426) 
 
0.0037 
[0.9532] 
(0.3418) 
 
0.0036 
[0.8983] 
(0.3703) 
 
0.0030 
[0.7845] 
(0.4339) 
 
0.0032 
[0.7845] 
(0.4339) 
 
0.0037 
[0.9779] 
(0.3296) 
 
0.0034 
[0.8215] 
(0.4126) 
 
0.0035 
[0.9276] 
(0.3550) 
 
0.0031 
[0.7595] 
(0.4487) 
 
VSTOXX -0.2938*** 
[-4.4220] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.3010*** 
[-4.2323] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.2755*** 
[-4.1342] 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.2966*** 
[-4.1900] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.2599*** 
[-4.0101] 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.2843*** 
[-4.1103] 
0.0001) 
 
-0.2752*** 
[-4.2750] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.3248*** 
[-4.2302] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.2612*** 
[-3.9785] 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.3234*** 
[-4.1896] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.2460*** 
[-3.8368] 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.3107*** 
[-4.1206] 
(0.0001) 
 
INT 0.1069 
[1.2858] 
(0.2002) 
 
0.1173 
[1.3994] 
(0.1635) 
 
0.1255 
[1.4132] 
(0.1594) 
 
0.1305 
[1.5234] 
(0.1295) 
 
0.1034 
[1.2193] 
(0.2244) 
 
0.1086 
[1.3302] 
(0.1852) 
 
0.0777 
[0.7764] 
(0.4386) 
 
0.0933 
[0.9613] 
(0.3379) 
 
0.0988 
[0.9438] 
(0.3467) 
 
0.1091 
[1.1239] 
(0.2628) 
 
0.0780 
[0.7714] 
(0.4416) 
 
0.0871 
[0.9352] 
(0.3511) 
 
RET 0.2786*** 
[2.6478] 
(0.0088) 
 
0.2859** 
[2.3581] 
(0.0195) 
 
0.2730** 
[2.4548] 
(0.0151) 
 
0.2864** 
[2.3583] 
(0.0195) 
 
0.2727** 
[2.4624] 
(0.0148) 
 
0.2885** 
[2.3850] 
(0.0182) 
 
0.3460*** 
[4.2396] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3907*** 
[4.0488] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.3375*** 
[3.8403] 
(0.0002) 
 
0.3857*** 
[3.8869] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.3356*** 
[3.8291] 
(0.0002) 
 
0.3867*** 
[3.9358] 
(0.0001) 
 
PER 0.3274*** 
[3.0680] 
(0.0025) 
 
0.3234*** 
[2.9697] 
(0.0034) 
 
0.3172*** 
[2.9460] 
(0.0037) 
 
0.3191*** 
[2.9560] 
(0.0036) 
 
0.3222*** 
[3.0200] 
(0.0029) 
 
0.3248*** 
[3.0440] 
(0.0027) 
 
0.3187*** 
[2.8927] 
(0.0043) 
 
0.3098*** 
[2.8499] 
(0.0050) 
 
0.3087*** 
[2.7845] 
(0.0060) 
 
0.3076*** 
[2.8465] 
(0.0050) 
 
0.3145*** 
[2.8731] 
(0.0046) 
 
0.3139*** 
[2.9551] 
(0.0036) 
 
INF -0.1415** 
[-2.4956] 
(0.0135) 
 
-0.1455** 
[-2.5067] 
(0.0131) 
 
-0.1371** 
[-2.3570] 
(0.0195) 
 
-0.1358** 
[-2.3277] 
(0.0211) 
 
-0.1275** 
[-2.3016] 
(0.0226) 
 
-0.1255** 
[-2.2702] 
(0.0244) 
 
-0.1281** 
[-2.3219] 
(0.0215) 
 
-0.1249** 
[-2.1853] 
(0.0303) 
 
-0.1285** 
[-2.2617] 
(0.0251) 
 
-0.1204** 
[-2.0735] 
(0.0397) 
 
-0.1186** 
[-2.1516] 
(0.0329) 
 
-0.1091* 
[-1.9502] 
(0.0529) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.3414 
 
0.3197 
 
0.3322 
 
0.3297 
 
0.3366 
 
0.3347 
 
0.4089 
 
0.4012 
 
0.3966 
 
0.4048 0.4008 
 
0.4105 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Belgium suffers from one crisis during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the 
significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A11: DENMARK, OLS, 2000-2014 
Independent var.             
PURERSENT -0.0352 
[-0.5315] 
(0.5957) 
 
-0.0160 
[-0.2192] 
(0.8268) 
 
  0.0197 
[0.1816] 
(0.8561) 
 
0.0751 
[0.7322] 
(0.4650) 
 
-0.0284 
[-0.4373] 
(0.6625) 
 
-0.0036 
[-0.0485] 
(0.9614) 
 
  -0.036176 
[-0.3572] 
(0.7215) 
 
0.0314 
[0.3451] 
(0.7305) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)   -0.0598 
[-0.7365] 
(0.4624) 
 
-0.0675 
[-0.7747] 
(0.4396) 
 
-0.0741 
[-0.5818] 
(0.5615) 
 
-0.1225 
[-1.0150] 
(0.3116) 
 
  -0.0139 
[-0.1618] 
(0.8717) 
 
-0.0241 
[-0.2548] 
(0.7993) 
 
0.011571 
[0.0882] 
(0.9299) 
 
-0.0463 
[-0.3717] 
(0.7106) 
 
CRISIS CODE       -0.0547 
[-0.8002] 
(0.4248) 
 
-0.0660 
[-0.8493] 
(0.3971) 
 
-0.0591 
[-0.8763] 
(0.3823) 
 
-0.0667 
[-0.8570] 
(0.3928) 
 
-0.060077 
[-0.8872] 
0.3764) 
 
-0.0660 
[-0.8468] 
(0.3985) 
 
1M RET.(-1)  -0.1748*** 
[-2.6708] 
(0.0083) 
 
 -0.1789*** 
[-2.6240] 
(0.0095) 
 
 -0.1879*** 
[-2.9018] 
(0.0042) 
 
 -0.2615*** 
[-4.2273] 
(0.0000) 
 
 -0.2627*** 
[-4.2430] 
(0.0000) 
 
 -0.2662*** 
[-4.4507] 
(0.0000) 
 
C 0.0002 
[0.0316] 
(0.9748) 
 
0.0002 
[0.0333] 
(0.9735) 
 
-0.0001 
[-0.0261] 
(0.9792) 
 
-0.0003 
[-0.0581] 
(0.9538) 
 
-1.77E-05 
[-0.0036] 
(0.9971) 
 
8.04E-05 
[0.0145] 
(0.9885) 
 
-0.0027 
[-0.4333] 
(0.6654) 
 
-0.0036 
[-0.4840] 
(0.6291) 
 
-0.002288 
[-0.3779] 
(0.7060) 
 
-0.003673 
[-0.5029] 
(0.6158) 
 
-0.0024 
[-0.3973] 
(0.6917) 
 
-0.0036 
[-0.4818] 
(0.6307) 
 
VSTOXX -0.2235*** 
[-3.5182] 
(0.0006) 
 
-0.2824*** 
[-4.4809] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.2240*** 
[-3.4506] 
(0.0007) 
 
-0.2791*** 
[-4.4010] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.2239*** 
[-3.4556] 
(0.0007) 
 
-0.2815*** 
[-4.4372] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.2098*** 
[-3.2652] 
(0.0014) 
 
-0.2879*** 
[-4.4070] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.2160*** 
[-3.3446] 
(0.0010) 
 
-0.2867*** 
[-4.3722] 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.2161*** 
[-3.3118] 
(0.0012) 
 
-0.2875*** 
[-4.3871] 
(0.0000) 
 
INT -0.1078 
[-1.5026] 
(0.1348) 
 
-0.1147 
[-1.5373] 
(0.1261) 
-0.0976 
[-1.2569] 
(0.2105) 
-0.1026 
[-1.2503] 
(0.2129) 
-0.0963 
[-1.2352] 
(0.2184) 
-0.0980 
[-1.1921] 
(0.2349) 
-0.0864 
[-1.2699] 
(0.2061) 
-0.0914 
[-1.2932] 
(0.1979) 
-0.0844 
[-1.1827] 
(0.2388) 
-0.0874 
[-1.1413] 
(0.2556) 
-0.0860 
[-1.1823] 
(0.2390) 
-0.0861 
[-1.1181] 
(0.2653) 
RET 0.2734*** 
[3.4327] 
(0.0007) 
 
0.3145*** 
[3.2325] 
(0.0015) 
 
0.2798*** 
[3.8853] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.3368*** 
[3.6829] 
(0.0003) 
 
0.2759*** 
[3.6004] 
(0.0004) 
 
0.3249*** 
[3.4170] 
(0.0008) 
 
0.3519*** 
[4.7225] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4342*** 
[5.1580] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3383*** 
[4.9364] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4435*** 
[5.5039] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3457*** 
[4.8988] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4384*** 
[5.3831] 
(0.0000) 
 
PER 0.4328*** 
[3.7536] 
(0.0002) 
 
0.4276*** 
[3.9786] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.4263*** 
[3.7219] 
(0.0003) 
 
0.4217*** 
[3.9265] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.4257*** 
[3.7334] 
(0.0003) 
 
0.4194*** 
[3.9575] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.3901*** 
[3.7375] 
(0.0003) 
 
0.3768*** 
[4.1482] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.3873*** 
[3.7295] 
(0.0003) 
 
0.3751*** 
[4.1081] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.3880*** 
[3.7185] 
(0.0003) 
 
0.3744*** 
[4.1229] 
(0.0001) 
 
INF 0.0690 
[1.0540] 
(0.2933) 
 
0.0851 
[1.3654] 
(0.1739) 
 
0.0728 
[1.1314] 
(0.2595) 
 
0.0873 
[1.4540] 
(0.1478) 
 
0.0744 
[1.1582] 
(0.2484) 
 
0.0940 
[1.5865] 
(0.1145) 
 
0.1098* 
[1.6651] 
(0.0980) 
 
0.1288** 
[2.1627] 
(0.0322) 
 
0.1130* 
[1.7183] 
(0.0878) 
 
0.1291** 
[2.2072] 
(0.0288) 
 
0.1101 
[1.6349] 
(0.1042) 
 
0.1318** 
[2.2441] 
(0.0263) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.3472 
 
0.3695 
 
0.3501 
 
0.3726 
 
0.3464 
 
0.3708 
 
0.3966 
 
0.4472 
 
0.3982 
 
0.4476 
 
0.3945 
 
0.4442 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Denmark suffers from two crises during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the 
significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A12: FRANCE, OLS, 2000-2014 
Independent var.             
PURERSENT -0.0149 
[-0.3559] 
(0.7224) 
 
-0.0264 
[-0.5898] 
(0.5561) 
 
  0.1755** 
[1.9857] 
(0.0487) 
 
0.1611* 
[1.7722] 
(0.0782) 
 
0.0504 
[0.9097] 
(0.3645) 
 
0.0442 
[0.7564] 
(0.4506) 
 
  0.1890* 
[1.9234] 
(0.0564) 
 
0.1751* 
[1.7328] 
(0.0853) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)   -0.1133** 
[-2.5293] 
(0.0123) 
 
-0.1240*** 
[-2.7876] 
(0.0059) 
 
-0.2469*** 
[-2.6319] 
(0.0093) 
 
-0.2460*** 
[-2.6284] 
(0.0094) 
 
  -0.0942 
[-1.2743] 
(0.2046) 
 
-0.0894 
[-1.1875] 
(0.2370) 
 
-0.2138* 
[-1.8742] 
(0.0629) 
 
-0.2004* 
[-1.7100] 
(0.0894) 
 
CRISIS CODE       -0.1161** 
[-2.1998] 
(0.0294) 
 
-0.1295** 
[-2.2855] 
(0.0237) 
 
-0.0243 
[-0.3819] 
(0.7031) 
 
-0.0485 
[-0.6867] 
(0.4934) 
 
-0.0681 
[-1.2004] 
(0.2319) 
 
-0.0881 
[-1.4264] 
(0.1559) 
 
1M RET.(-1)  -0.1517** 
[-2.6071] 
0.0100) 
 
 -0.1609*** 
[-2.9925] 
(0.0032) 
 
 -0.1508*** 
[-2.7691] 
(0.0063) 
 
 -0.2053*** 
[-3.5250] 
(0.0006) 
 
 -0.2041*** 
[-3.5672] 
(0.0005) 
 
 -0.1960*** 
[-3.3857] 
(0.0009) 
 
C 0.0006 
[0.2842] 
(0.7766) 
 
0.0003 
[0.1337] 
(0.8938) 
 
0.0006 
[0.2917] 
(0.7708) 
 
0.0002 
[0.0935] 
(0.9256) 
 
0.0008 
[0.3939] 
(0.6941) 
 
0.0004 
[0.1907] 
(0.8490) 
 
0.0043 
[1.1751] 
(0.2418) 
 
0.0037 
[0.9712] 
(0.3331) 
 
0.0003 
[0.0722] 
(0.9426) 
 
8.98E-05 
[0.0209] 
(0.9833) 
 
0.0024 
[0.6519] 
(0.5155) 
 
0.0021 
[0.5366] 
(0.5924) 
 
VSTOXX -0.1100* 
[-1.8932] 
(0.0600) 
 
-0.1829*** 
[-2.7186] 
(0.0072) 
 
-0.1048* 
[-1.8500] 
(0.0660) 
 
-0.1920*** 
[-2.9721] 
(0.0034) 
 
-0.1111** 
[-2.0505] 
(0.0419) 
 
-0.1922*** 
[-3.0930] 
(0.0023) 
 
-0.1197* 
[-1.9327] 
(0.0552) 
 
-0.2184*** 
[-2.9086] 
(0.0042) 
 
-0.1151* 
[-1.8593] 
(0.0650) 
 
-0.2209*** 
[-3.0112] 
(0.0031) 
 
-0.1226** 
[-2.0737] 
(0.0399) 
 
-0.2234*** 
[-3.1635] 
(0.0019) 
 
INT 0.1258** 
[2.2011] 
(0.0291) 
 
0.1197** 
[2.2116] 
(0.0283) 
 
0.1349** 
[2.3709] 
(0.0189) 
 
0.1310** 
[2.4621] 
(0.0148) 
 
0.1303** 
[2.2422] 
(0.0263) 
 
0.1271** 
[2.3181] 
(0.0217) 
 
0.1613*** 
[2.6556] 
(0.0088) 
 
0.1516*** 
[2.9242] 
(0.0040) 
 
0.1605** 
[2.6088] 
(0.0100) 
 
0.1536*** 
[2.8737] 
(0.0047) 
 
0.1568** 
[2.4814] 
(0.0142) 
 
0.1505*** 
[2.7205] 
(0.0073) 
 
RET 0.1952*** 
[3.6804] 
(0.0003) 
 
0.2429*** 
[4.0736] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.2023*** 
[3.6611] 
(0.0003) 
 
0.2470*** 
[4.0659] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.1914*** 
[3.5239] 
(0.0005) 
 
0.2342*** 
[3.8832] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.1836*** 
[2.6474] 
(0.0090) 
 
0.2532*** 
[3.5756] 
(0.0005) 
 
0.2334*** 
[3.1905] 
(0.0017) 
 
0.2938*** 
[3.9566] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.2029*** 
[2.8337] 
(0.0053) 
 
0.2631*** 
[3.6238] 
(0.0004) 
 
PER 0.6889*** 
[5.9295] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6798*** 
[5.7792] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6750*** 
[6.0002] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6623*** 
[5.7774] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6705*** 
[6.1669] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6591*** 
[5.9267] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6267*** 
[5.0315] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6016*** 
[4.8754] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6200*** 
[5.1036] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5938*** 
[4.8865] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6121*** 
[5.2517] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5876*** 
[5.0239] 
(0.0000) 
 
INF -0.0227 
[-0.4691] 
(0.6396) 
 
-0.0132 
[-0.2662] 
(0.7904) 
 
-0.0214 
[-0.4557] 
(0.6492) 
 
-0.0055 
[-0.1174] 
(0.9067) 
 
0.0054 
[0.1127] 
(0.9104) 
 
0.0180 
[0.3834] 
(0.7019) 
 
0.0053 
[0.1045] 
(0.9169) 
 
0.0241 
[0.4713] 
(0.6381) 
 
-0.0046 
[-0.0935] 
(0.9256) 
 
0.0179 
[0.3698] 
(0.7120) 
 
0.0188 
[0.3783] 
(0.7058) 
 
0.0386 
[0.7939] 
(0.4286) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.6021 
 
0.6155 
 
0.6176 
 
0.6320 
 
0.6264 
 
0.6389 
 
0.6069 
 
0.6308 
 
0.6132 
 
0.6364 
 
0.6238 
 
0.6451 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. France suffers from two crises during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the 
significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A13: GERMANY, OLS, 2000-2014 
Independent var.             
PURERSENT -0.0228 
[-0.4232] 
(0.6727) 
 
-0.0369 
[-0.6214] 
(0.5352) 
 
  0.4032*** 
[3.0626] 
(0.0026) 
 
0.3756** 
[2.5625] 
(0.0113) 
 
-0.0011 
[-0.0208] 
(0.9834) 
 
0.0011 
[0.0204] 
(0.9837) 
 
  0.2645** 
[2.1445] 
(0.0337) 
 
0.2221 
[1.6327] 
(0.1047) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)   -0.1287** 
[-2.0119] 
(0.0458) 
 
-0.1288** 
[-2.0033] 
(0.0467) 
 
-0.4736*** 
[-3.3320] 
(0.0011) 
 
-0.4501*** 
[-2.9998] 
(0.0031) 
 
  -0.0788 
[-1.3292] 
(0.1858) 
 
-0.0607 
[-1.0396] 
(0.3002) 
 
-0.2966** 
[-2.2685] 
(0.0248) 
 
-0.2477* 
[-1.7883] 
(0.0758) 
 
CRISIS CODE       -0.0634 
[-0.9589] 
(0.3392) 
 
-0.0802 
[-1.1312] 
(0.2598) 
 
-0.0422 
[-0.6364] 
(0.5255) 
 
-0.0606 
[-0.8435] 
(0.4003) 
 
-0.0530 
[-0.8526] 
(0.3953) 
 
-0.0656 
[-0.9770] 
(0.3302) 
 
1M RET.(-1)  -0.1155 
[-1.4577] 
(0.1468) 
 
 -0.1104 
[-1.4973] 
(0.1362) 
 
 -0.0528 
[-0.6340] 
(0.5269) 
 
 -0.1461 
[-1.6361] 
(0.1040) 
 
 -0.1352 
[-1.5523] 
(0.1228) 
 
 -0.1038 
[-1.0859] 
(0.2793) 
 
C 0.0007 
[0.1875] 
(0.8515) 
 
0.0005 
[0.1208] 
(0.9040) 
 
0.0003 
[0.0832] 
(0.9338) 
 
0.0002 
[0.0394] 
(0.9686) 
 
0.0006 
[0.1787] 
(0.8584) 
 
0.0005 
[0.1440] 
(0.8857) 
 
0.0017 
[0.4123] 
(0.6807) 
 
0.0013 
[0.2985] 
(0.7658) 
 
0.0009 
[0.2268] 
(0.8209) 
 
0.0006 
[0.1447] 
(0.8851) 
 
0.0016 
[0.4146] 
(0.6791) 
 
0.0013 
[0.3089] 
(0.7578) 
 
VSTOXX -0.1796*** 
[-3.3098] 
(0.0011) 
 
-0.2352*** 
[-2.9526] 
(0.0036) 
 
-0.1785*** 
[-3.2994] 
(0.0012) 
 
-0.2341*** 
[-3.0543] 
(0.0026) 
 
-0.1977*** 
[-3.4196] 
(0.0008) 
 
-0.2229*** 
[-2.7707] 
(0.0062) 
 
-0.1901*** 
[-3.2296] 
(0.0015) 
 
-0.2540*** 
[-2.9188] 
(0.0041) 
 
-0.1931*** 
[-3.2597] 
(0.0014) 
 
-0.2520*** 
[-2.9682] 
(0.0035) 
 
-0.2021*** 
[-3.2654] 
(0.0014) 
 
-0.2457*** 
[-2.7998] 
(0.0058) 
 
INT 0.0606 
[0.8804] 
(0.3799) 
 
0.0616 
[0.8754] 
(0.3826) 
 
0.0754 
[1.1291] 
(0.2605) 
 
0.0734 
[1.0665] 
(0.2877) 
 
0.0450 
[0.7043] 
(0.4822) 
 
0.0461 
[0.7117] 
(0.4776) 
 
0.1096 
[1.7152] 
(0.0884) 
 
0.1023 
[1.5596] 
(0.1210) 
 
0.1175 
[1.8400] 
(0.0678) 
 
0.1082 
[1.6321] 
(0.1048) 
 
0.0915 
[1.4528] 
(0.1484) 
 
0.0886 
[1.3788] 
(0.1701) 
 
RET 0.2888*** 
[3.4867] 
(0.0006) 
 
0.3202*** 
[3.1500] 
(0.0019) 
 
0.3090*** 
[3.8230] 
(0.0002) 
 
0.3372*** 
[3.5048] 
(0.0006) 
 
0.2842*** 
[3.7581] 
(0.0002) 
 
0.2993*** 
[3.1784] 
(0.0018) 
 
0.2802*** 
[3.2363] 
(0.0015) 
 
0.3242*** 
[2.9470] 
(0.0037) 
 
0.3067*** 
[3.5412] 
(0.0005) 
 
0.3450*** 
[3.2384] 
(0.0015) 
 
0.2818*** 
[3.3603] 
(0.0010) 
 
0.3150*** 
[2.9190] 
(0.0041) 
 
PER 0.5596*** 
[4.4005] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5552*** 
[4.4886] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5494*** 
[4.4135] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5461*** 
[4.5233] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5207*** 
[4.1812] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5211*** 
[4.2544] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5361*** 
[3.9806] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.5100*** 
[3.7228] 
(0.0003) 
 
0.5355*** 
[3.9762] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.5135*** 
[3.7566] 
(0.0002) 
 
0.5107*** 
[3.7410] 
(0.0003) 
 
0.4978*** 
[3.6098] 
(0.0004) 
 
INF -0.0151 
[-0.2759] 
(0.7830) 
 
-0.0144 
[-0.2826] 
(0.7778) 
 
-0.0135 
[-0.2520] 
(0.8014) 
 
-0.0126 
[-0.2537] 
(0.8000) 
 
-0.0059 
[-0.1215] 
(0.9035) 
 
-0.0060 
[-0.1272] 
(0.8989) 
 
-0.0426 
[-0.8279] 
(0.4091) 
 
-0.0355 
[-0.7413] 
(0.4597) 
 
-0.0392 
[-0.7594] 
(0.4488) 
 
-0.0331 
[-0.6898] 
(0.4914) 
 
-0.0273 
[-0.5335] 
(0.5945) 
 
-0.0247 
[-0.5087] 
(0.6117) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.4167 
 
0.4215 
 
0.4318 
 
0.4369 
 
0.4603 
 
0.4589 
 
0.4768 
 
0.4859 
 
0.4821 
 
0.4899 
 
0.4927 
 
0.4955 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Germany suffers from two crises during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the 
significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A14: ITALY, OLS, 2000-2014 
Independent var.             
PURERSENT -0.0253 
[-0.5620] 
(0.5749) 
 
-0.0335 
[-0.7232] 
(0.4706) 
 
  0.1092 
[0.8532] 
(0.3947) 
 
0.0674 
[0.5516] 
(0.5819) 
 
-0.0487 
[-0.9766] 
(0.3302) 
 
-0.060662 
[-1.1743] 
(0.2420) 
 
  0.1261 
[0.8600] 
(0.3911) 
 
0.0818 
[0.6058] 
(0.5455) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)   -0.0523 
[-1.1023] 
(0.2719) 
 
-0.0498 
[-1.0169] 
(0.3106) 
 
-0.1503 
[-1.1191] 
(0.2647) 
 
-0.1104 
[-0.8564] 
(0.3930) 
 
  -0.0777 
[-1.3355] 
(0.1836) 
 
-0.0804 
[-1.3435] 
(0.1810) 
 
-0.1923 
[-1.1832] 
(0.2385) 
 
-0.1547 
[-1.0118] 
(0.3132) 
 
CRISIS CODE       -0.0555 
[-1.3036] 
(0.1942) 
 
-0.0718 
[-1.5354] 
(0.1267) 
 
-0.0593 
[-1.3365] 
(0.1833) 
 
-0.0754 
[-1.5619] 
(0.1203) 
 
-0.0608 
[-1.3445] 
(0.1807) 
 
-0.0761 
[-1.5619] 
(0.1203) 
 
1M RET.(-1)  -0.1539** 
[-2.3280] 
(0.0211) 
 
 -0.1511** 
[-2.2796] 
(0.0239) 
 
 -0.1463** 
[-2.2083] 
(0.0286) 
 
 -0.2211*** 
[-3.9014] 
(0.0001) 
 
 -0.2187*** 
[-3.9039] 
(0.0001) 
 
 -0.2147*** 
[-3.9411] 
(0.0001) 
 
C -0.0010 
[-0.3478] 
(0.7284) 
 
-0.0014 
[-0.4726] 
(0.6371) 
 
-0.0011 
[-0.3949] 
(0.6934) 
 
-0.0014 
[-0.4692] 
(0.6395) 
 
-0.0010 
[-0.3620] 
(0.7178) 
 
-0.0014 
[-0.4467] 
(0.6557) 
 
-0.0005 
[-0.1532] 
(0.8784) 
 
-0.0011 
[-0.3241] 
(0.7463) 
 
-0.0005 
[-0.1561] 
(0.8762) 
 
-0.0010 
[-0.2942] 
(0.7690) 
 
-0.0004 
[-0.1289] 
(0.8976) 
 
-0.0010 
[-0.2739] 
(0.7845) 
 
VSTOXX -0.2268*** 
[-3.4559] 
(0.0007) 
 
-0.3016*** 
[-3.9119] 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.2265*** 
[-3.4034] 
(0.0008) 
 
-0.2970*** 
[-3.8257] 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.2191*** 
[-3.3635] 
(0.0009) 
 
-0.2902*** 
[-3.8484] 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.2169*** 
[-3.2708] 
(0.0013) 
 
-0.3192*** 
[-4.0790] 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.2142*** 
[-3.1645] 
(0.0019) 
 
-0.3127*** 
[-3.9802] 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.2059*** 
[-3.0784] 
(0.0025) 
 
-0.3055*** 
[-3.9907] 
(0.0001) 
 
INT -0.0310 
[-0.5535] 
(0.5807) 
 
-0.0163 
[-0.2959] 
(0.7677) 
 
-0.0287 
[-0.5138] 
(0.6081) 
 
-0.0172 
[-0.3108] 
(0.7563) 
 
-0.0200 
[-0.3557] 
(0.7225) 
 
-0.0121 
[-0.2185] 
(0.8273) 
 
-0.0189 
[-0.2939] 
(0.7692) 
 
-0.0030 
[-0.0508] 
(0.9596) 
 
-0.0155 
[-0.2426] 
(0.8086) 
 
-0.0020 
[-0.0343] 
(0.9727) 
 
-0.0055 
[-0.0863] 
(0.9313) 
 
0.0042 
[0.0725] 
(0.9423) 
 
RET 0.2712*** 
[3.7935] 
(0.0002) 
 
0.2923*** 
[3.5772] 
(0.0005) 
 
0.2640*** 
[3.6865] 
(0.0003) 
 
0.2909*** 
[3.5749] 
(0.0005) 
 
0.2589*** 
[3.5814] 
(0.0004) 
 
0.2869*** 
[3.5013] 
(0.0006) 
 
0.3278*** 
[4.9276] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3712*** 
[5.2379] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.320075*** 
[4.7944] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3684*** 
[5.2407] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3147*** 
[4.6978] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3641*** 
[5.1683] 
(0.0000) 
 
PER 0.5398*** 
[4.9091] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5181*** 
[4.8597] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5403*** 
[4.9458] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5185*** 
[4.8827] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5407*** 
[4.9554] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5195*** 
[4.8829] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5204*** 
[4.8658] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4805*** 
[5.0747] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5201*** 
[4.9143] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4802*** 
[5.1186] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5200*** 
[4.9390] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4808*** 
[5.1305] 
(0.0000) 
 
INF 0.0608 
[0.7677] 
(0.4437) 
 
0.0563 
[0.7300] 
(0.4664) 
 
0.0616 
[0.7725] 
(0.4409) 
 
0.0569 
[0.7323] 
(0.4650) 
 
0.0623 
[0.7682] 
(0.4434) 
 
0.0575 
[0.7306] 
(0.4660) 
 
0.0636 
[0.7682] 
(0.4435) 
 
0.059414 
[0.749611] 
(0.4546) 
 
0.0652 
[0.7802] 
(0.4364) 
 
0.0608 
[0.7593] 
(0.4488) 
 
0.0668 
[0.7860] 
(0.4330) 
 
0.0619 
[0.7615] 
(0.4475) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.4340 
 
0.4489 
 
0.4370 
 
0.4503 
 
0.4358 
 
0.4479 
 
0.4717 
 
0.5032 
 
0.4759 
 
0.5061 
 
0.4752 
 
0.5040 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Italy suffers from one crisis during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the 
significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A15: SPAIN, OLS, 2000-2014 
Independent var.             
PURERSENT -0.0598 
[-0.9668] 
(0.3350) 
 
-0.0593 
[-0.9633] 
(0.3367) 
 
  0.0053 
[0.0363] 
(0.9711) 
 
0.0061 
[0.0417] 
(0.9668) 
 
-0.0038 
[-0.0619] 
(0.9507) 
 
-0.0014 
[-0.0214] 
(0.9830) 
 
  0.0581 
[0.3669] 
(0.7142) 
 
0.0491 
[0.3141] 
(0.7539) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)   -0.0663 
[-1.1945] 
(0.2339) 
 
-0.0712 
[-1.2883] 
(0.1994) 
 
-0.0710 
[-0.5235] 
(0.6013) 
 
-0.0765 
[-0.5672] 
(0.5713) 
 
  -0.0126 
[-0.2264] 
(0.8212) 
 
-0.0157 
[-0.2681] 
(0.7890) 
 
-0.0637 
[-0.4254] 
(0.6712) 
 
-0.0588 
[-0.4019] 
(0.6883) 
 
CRISIS CODE       0.0512 
[0.9261] 
(0.3559) 
 
0.0462 
[0.8353] 
(0.4049) 
 
0.0580 
[1.0807] 
(0.2816) 
 
0.0458 
[0.8240] 
(0.4113) 
 
0.0598 
[1.1192] 
(0.2649) 
 
0.0474 
[0.8580] 
(0.3923) 
 
1M RET.(-1)  -0.0531 
[-0.6494] 
(0.5170] 
 
 -0.0556 
[-0.6922] 
(0.4897) 
 
 -0.0556 
[-0.6904] 
(0.4909) 
 
 -0.1358* 
[-1.8799] 
(0.0621) 
 
 -0.1362* 
[-1.8812] 
(0.0619) 
 
 -0.1350* 
[-1.8564] 
(0.0654) 
 
C 0.0014 
[0.4379] 
(0.6620) 
 
0.0015 
[0.4366] 
(0.6630) 
 
0.0017 
[0.5232] 
(0.6015) 
 
0.0016 
[0.4729] 
(0.6369) 
 
0.0017 
[0.5210] 
(0.6031) 
 
0.0016 
[0.4711] 
(0.6382) 
 
-0.0036 
[-0.7948] 
(0.4280) 
 
-0.0038 
[-0.7763] 
(0.4388) 
 
-0.0037 
[-0.8069] 
(0.4210) 
 
-0.0037 
[-0.7476] 
(0.4559) 
 
-0.0036 
[-0.7987] 
(0.4258) 
 
-0.0036 
[-0.7414] 
(0.4596) 
 
VSTOXX -0.1264** 
[-2.0773] 
(0.0393) 
 
-0.1439* 
[-1.9340] 
(0.0548) 
 
-0.1138* 
[-1.8638] 
(0.0641) 
 
-0.1412* 
[-1.9009] 
(0.0590) 
 
-0.1136* 
[-1.7990] 
(0.0738) 
 
-0.1409* 
[-1.8655] 
(0.0638) 
 
-0.1054 
[-1.6147] 
(0.1085) 
 
-0.1530* 
[-1.8907] 
(0.0606) 
 
-0.0931 
[-1.4276] 
(0.1555) 
 
-0.1533* 
[-1.9140] 
(0.0576) 
 
-0.0896 
[-1.3089] 
(0.1926) 
 
-0.1498* 
[-1.8043] 
(0.0732) 
 
INT 0.0609 
[1.0671] 
(0.2874) 
 
0.0559 
[0.9772] 
(0.3299) 
 
0.0676 
[1.1458] 
(0.2535) 
 
0.0652 
[1.1048] 
(0.2708) 
 
0.0679 
[1.1333] 
(0.2587) 
 
0.0655 
[1.0931] 
(0.2759) 
 
0.0593 
[0.9276] 
(0.3551) 
 
0.0436 
[0.6945] 
(0.4885) 
 
0.0606 
[0.8968] 
(0.3713) 
 
0.0488 
[0.7380] 
(0.4617) 
 
0.0640 
[0.9155] 
(0.3614) 
 
0.0517 
[0.7519] 
(0.4533) 
 
RET 0.1562** 
[2.2108] 
(0.0284) 
 
0.1730** 
[2.2233] 
(0.0275) 
 
0.1534** 
[2.1304] 
(0.0346) 
 
0.1687** 
[2.1489] 
(0.0331) 
 
0.1529** 
[2.0705] 
(0.0399) 
 
0.1681** 
[2.1008] 
(0.0371) 
 
0.2375*** 
[3.3685] 
(0.0010) 
 
0.2888*** 
[3.7717] 
(0.0002) 
 
0.2445*** 
[3.4151] 
(0.0008) 
 
0.2888*** 
[3.7461] 
(0.0003) 
 
0.2388*** 
[3.1793] 
(0.0018) 
 
0.2836*** 
[3.5123] 
(0.0006) 
 
PER 0.6178*** 
[4.5263] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6107*** 
[4.5522] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6246*** 
[4.6271] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6155*** 
[4.6289] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6251*** 
[4.6749] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6161*** 
[4.6758] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6046*** 
[4.4257] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5779*** 
[4.3498] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6075*** 
[4.4937] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5781*** 
[4.3836] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6131*** 
[4.6036] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5831*** 
[4.4861] 
(0.0000) 
 
INF -0.0107 
[-0.2112] 
(0.8330) 
 
-0.0071 
[-0.1454] 
(0.8846) 
 
-0.0062 
[-0.1218] 
(0.9032) 
 
-0.0010 
[-0.0199] 
(0.9842) 
 
-0.0058 
[-0.1091] 
(0.9133) 
 
-0.0005 
[-0.0092] 
(0.9927) 
 
-0.0214 
[-0.3897] 
(0.6973) 
 
-0.0061 
[-0.1180] 
(0.9063) 
 
-0.0220 
[-0.3930] 
(0.6949) 
 
-0.0050 
-0.0950] 
(0.9244) 
 
-0.0177 
[-0.3050] 
(0.7608) 
 
-0.0014 
[-0.0265] 
(0.9789) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.4568 
 
0.4550 
 
0.4573 
 
0.4563 
 
0.4542 
 
0.4531 
 
0.4639 
 
0.4739 
 
0.4654 
 
0.4741 
 
0.4626 
 
0.4711 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Spain suffers from two crises during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the 
significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A16: SWEDEN, OLS, 2000-2014 
Independent var.             
PURERSENT -0.1434** 
[-2.2054] 
(0.0287) 
 
-0.1518** 
[-2.2528] 
(0.0255) 
 
  -0.0666 
[-0.4820] 
(0.6304) 
 
-0.0448 
[-0.3367] 
(0.7366) 
 
-0.1326** 
[-1.9794] 
(0.0495) 
 
-0.1414** 
[-1.9982] 
(0.0474) 
 
  -0.0597 
[-0.4044] 
(0.6865) 
 
-0.0320 
[-0.2230] 
(0.8239) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)   -0.1541** 
[-2.04851] 
(0.0420) 
 
-0.1785** 
[-2.3081] 
(0.0222) 
 
-0.1031 
[-0.6889] 
(0.4918) 
 
-0.1438 
[-0.9972] 
(0.3201) 
 
  -0.1433* 
[-1.9384] 
(0.0543) 
 
-0.1699** 
[-2.2313] 
(0.0271) 
 
-0.0983 
[-0.6379] 
(0.5244) 
 
-0.1456 
[-0.9860] 
(0.3256) 
 
CRISIS CODE       -0.1000 
[-1.3710] 
(0.1723) 
 
-0.1335* 
[-1.7573] 
(0.0808) 
 
-0.1058 
[-1.4080] 
(0.1611) 
 
-0.1315* 
[-1.6960] 
(0.0918) 
 
-0.1054 
[-1.4012] 
(0.1631) 
 
-0.1310* 
[-1.6833] 
(0.0943) 
 
1M RET.(-1)  -0.1573** 
[-2.1801] 
(0.0306) 
 
 -0.1750** 
[-2.4769] 
(0.0142) 
 
 -0.1723** 
[-2.3751] 
(0.0187) 
 
 -0.1891*** 
[-2.9275] 
(0.0039) 
 
 -0.2065*** 
[-3.3260] 
(0.0011) 
 
 -0.2045*** 
[-3.1334] 
(0.0021) 
 
C -0.0013 
[-0.3104] 
(0.7567) 
 
-0.0019 
[-0.4380] 
(0.6620) 
 
-0.0007 
[-0.1823] 
(0.8556) 
 
-0.0013 
[-0.3018] 
(0.7632) 
 
-0.0011 
[-0.2575] 
(0.7971) 
 
-0.0015 
[-0.3441] 
(0.7312) 
 
0.0014 
[0.3225] 
(0.7475) 
 
0.0016 
[0.3227] 
(0.7474) 
 
0.0020 
[0.4647] 
(0.6428) 
 
0.0020 
[0.4134] 
(0.6794) 
 
0.0017 
[0.3810] 
(0.7037) 
 
0.0019 
[0.3723] 
(0.7102) 
 
VSTOXX -0.1520** 
[-2.3751] 
(0.0186) 
 
-0.2301*** 
[-2.7579] 
(0.0065) 
 
-0.1501** 
[-2.2435] 
(0.0261) 
 
-0.2329*** 
[-2.7717] 
(0.0062) 
 
-0.1508** 
[-2.2235] 
(0.0275) 
 
-0.2321*** 
[-2.7773] 
(0.0061) 
 
-0.1545** 
[-2.1875] 
(0.0302) 
 
-0.2491*** 
[-2.9058] 
(0.0042) 
 
-0.1584** 
[-2.1796] 
(0.0307) 
 
-0.2521*** 
[-2.9456] 
(0.0037) 
 
-0.1590** 
[-2.1589] 
(0.0324) 
 
-0.2515*** 
[-2.9502] 
(0.0037) 
 
INT -0.1424** 
[-2.5417] 
(0.0119) 
 
-0.1593*** 
[-2.7835] 
(0.0060) 
 
-0.1136* 
[-1.7490] 
(0.0821) 
 
-0.1249* 
[-1.9374] 
(0.0543) 
 
-0.1212* 
[-1.6603] 
(0.0987) 
 
-0.1299* 
[-1.8262] 
(0.0696) 
 
-0.1287** 
[-2.3627] 
(0.0193) 
 
-0.1470*** 
[-2.6367] 
(0.0092) 
 
-0.1037 
[-1.6202] 
(0.1072) 
 
-0.1162* 
[-1.8361] 
(0.0682) 
 
-0.1098 
[-1.5247] 
(0.1293) 
 
-0.1193* 
[-1.7199] 
(0.0874) 
 
RET 0.3565*** 
[4.5861] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3951*** 
[4.7031] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3397*** 
[4.5314] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3964*** 
[4.6237] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3519*** 
[4.5547] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4038*** 
[4.7399] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3319*** 
[4.1981] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3672*** 
[4.3970] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3089*** 
[4.3303] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3695*** 
[4.5138] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3206*** 
[4.1516] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.3752*** 
[4.4322] 
(0.0000) 
 
PER 0.4820*** 
[3.3876] 
(0.0009) 
 
0.4736*** 
[3.2851] 
(0.0012) 
 
0.4741*** 
[3.3145] 
(0.0011) 
 
0.4652*** 
[3.2240] 
(0.0015) 
 
0.4752*** 
[3.3126] 
(0.0011) 
 
0.4661*** 
[3.2208] 
(0.0015) 
 
0.4545*** 
[3.2197] 
(0.0016) 
 
0.4426*** 
[3.1455] 
(0.0020) 
 
0.4448*** 
[3.1277] 
(0.0021) 
 
0.4352*** 
[3.0760] 
(0.0025) 
 
0.4458*** 
[3.1243] 
(0.0021) 
 
0.4358*** 
[3.0674] 
[0.0025) 
 
INF -0.0050 
[-0.0804] 
(0.9360) 
 
0.0056 
[0.0914] 
(0.9273) 
 
-0.0202 
[-0.3216] 
(0.7482) 
 
-0.0152 
[-0.2495] 
(0.8033) 
 
-0.0136 
[-0.2108] 
(0.8333) 
 
-0.0108 
[-0.1716] 
(0.8640) 
 
0.0035 
[0.0536] 
(0.9573) 
 
0.0233 
[0.3697] 
(0.7121) 
 
-0.0056 
[-0.0846] 
(0.9327) 
 
0.0047 
[0.0749] 
(0.9404) 
 
2.54E-05 
[0.0004] 
(0.9997) 
 
0.0076 
[0.1182] 
(0.9061) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.3813 
 
0.3928 
 
0.3808 
 
0.3984 
 
0.3786 
 
0.3955 
 
0.3716 
 
0.3918 
 
0.3723 
 
0.3981 
 
0.3696 
 
0.3946 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Sweden suffers from one crisis during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the 
significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A17: UNITED KINGDOM, OLS, 2000-2014 
Independent var.             
PURERSENT 0.0474 
[1.1141] 
(0.2668) 
 
0.0519 
[1.1421] 
(0.2550) 
 
  0.1085 
[1.3439] 
(0.1808) 
 
0.1430* 
[1.7375] 
(0.0841) 
 
0.0387 
[0.8768] 
(0.3820) 
 
0.0529 
[1.0740] 
(0.2846) 
 
  0.1084 
[1.2519] 
(0.2126) 
 
0.1593* 
[1.7650] 
(0.0797) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)   0.0242 
[0.5785] 
(0.5637) 
 
0.0179 
[0.4043] 
(0.6865) 
 
-0.0666 
[-0.8251] 
(0.4105) 
 
-0.1033 
[-1.2259] 
(0.2220) 
 
  0.0135 
[0.3220] 
(0.7479) 
 
0.0104 
[0.2289] 
(0.8193) 
 
-0.0752 
[-0.9212] 
(0.3585) 
 
-0.1222 
[-1.4079] 
(0.1613) 
 
CRISIS CODE       0.0117 
[0.2389] 
(0.8116) 
 
-0.0146 
[-0.2733] 
(0.7850) 
 
0.0197 
[0.3801] 
[0.7044) 
 
0.0088 
[0.1671] 
(0.8675) 
 
0.0059 
[0.1123] 
(0.9107) 
 
-0.0083 
[-0.1544] 
(0.8775) 
 
1M RET.(-1)  -0.1902*** 
[-3.0161] 
(0.0030) 
 
 -0.1862*** 
[-2.9444] 
(0.0037) 
 
 -0.1968*** 
[-3.0513] 
(0.0027) 
 
 -0.2491*** 
[-3.8707] 
(0.0002) 
 
 -0.2450*** 
[-3.7772] 
(0.0002) 
 
 -0.2570*** 
[-3.8708] 
(0.0002) 
 
C 0.0019 
[0.9668] 
(0.3350) 
 
0.0016 
[0.7468] 
(0.4562) 
 
0.0015 
[0.7244 
(0.4698) 
 
0.0014 
[0.6504] 
(0.5163) 
 
0.0016 
[0.8125] 
(0.4177) 
 
0.0016 
[0.7296] 
(0.4666) 
 
-0.0014 
[-0.4597] 
(0.6464) 
 
-0.0014 
[-0.4410] 
(0.6599) 
 
-0.0021 
[-0.7148] 
(0.4759) 
 
-0.0026 
[-0.8504] 
(0.3965) 
 
-0.0014 
[-0.4429] 
(0.6585) 
 
-0.0017 
[-0.5383] 
(0.5912) 
 
VSTOXX -0.1556** 
[-2.5732] 
(0.0109) 
 
-0.2558*** 
[-3.5606] 
(0.0005) 
 
-0.1729*** 
[-2.7226] 
(0.0072) 
 
-0.0023*** 
[-3.6108] 
(0.0004) 
 
-0.1705*** 
[-2.6939] 
(0.0078) 
 
-0.2604*** 
[-3.6092] 
(0.0004) 
 
-0.1342** 
[-2.1567] 
(0.0327) 
 
-0.2548*** 
[-3.4937] 
(0.0006) 
 
-0.1505** 
[-2.3021] 
(0.0227) 
 
-0.2561*** 
[-3.5354] 
(0.0005) 
 
-0.1490** 
[-2.2882] 
(0.0236) 
 
-0.2601*** 
[-3.5484] 
(0.0005) 
 
INT -0.0821* 
[-1.9102] 
(0.0578) 
 
-0.0719* 
[-1.8867] 
(0.0609) 
 
-0.1037** 
[-2.4588] 
(0.0149) 
 
-0.0749* 
[-1.9631] 
(0.0513) 
 
-0.1008** 
[-2.3223] 
(0.0214) 
 
-0.0701* 
[-1.8116] 
(0.0718) 
 
-0.1044** 
[-2.3149] 
(0.0220) 
 
-0.0816** 
[-2.1369] 
(0.0343) 
-0.1230*** 
[-2.7303] 
(0.0071) 
 
-0.085161** 
[-2.2160] 
(0.0282) 
 
-0.1201** 
[-2.5875] 
(0.0107) 
 
-0.0796** 
[-2.048] 
(0.0424) 
 
RET 0.2381*** 
[4.2598] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2796*** 
[4.1857] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2465*** 
[4.4188] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2845*** 
[4.2583] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2419*** 
[4.2775] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2809*** 
[4.1647] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3470*** 
[6.1551] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.1150*** 
[6.3223] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3612*** 
[6.4786] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4157*** 
[6.6873] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3478*** 
[6.0956] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4022*** 
[6.4568] 
(0.0000) 
 
PER 0.6446*** 
[8.1706] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6318*** 
[8.0353] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6394*** 
[8.1838] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6247*** 
[8.0277] 
(0.00009) 
 
0.6474*** 
[8.1858] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6337*** 
[8.0188] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5977*** 
[7.2648] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5639*** 
[6.9602] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5933*** 
[7.2540] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5570*** 
[6.9413] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6008*** 
[7.2531] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5650*** 
[6.9243] 
(0.0000) 
 
INF 0.1166* 
[1.8615] 
(0.0644) 
 
0.1098* 
[1.8853] 
(0.0611) 
 
0.1222* 
[1.9019] 
(0.0589) 
 
0.1082* 
[1.8501] 
(0.0661) 
 
0.1269** 
[2.0058] 
(0.0465) 
 
0.1136** 
[1.9757] 
(0.0498) 
 
0.1135* 
[1.7872] 
(0.0760) 
 
0.1020* 
[1.7782] 
(0.0775) 
 
0.1193* 
[1.8203] 
(0.0707) 
 
0.0997* 
[1.7277] 
(0.0862) 
 
0.1239* 
[1.9188] 
(0.0570) 
 
0.1053* 
[1.8583] 
(0.0652) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.5478 
 
0.5661 
 
0.5409 
 
0.5622 
 
0.5423 
 
0.5660 
 
0.5769 
 
0.6120 
 
0.5709 
 
0.6082 
 
0.5716 
 
0.6127 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. United Kingdom suffers from two crises during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* 
indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A18: UNITED STATES, OLS, 2000-2014 
Independent var.             
PURERSENT 0.0146 
[0.4275] 
(0.6695) 
 
0.0079 
[0.2294] 
(0.8189) 
 
  0.1055 
[0.8651] 
(0.3882) 
 
0.1060 
[0.8655] 
(0.3880) 
 
0.0129 
[0.3212] 
(0.7486) 
 
0.0093 
[0.2281] 
(0.8199) 
 
  0.0557 
[0.5050] 
(0.6144) 
 
0.0572 
[0.5230] 
(0.6018) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)   -0.0141 
[-0.3701] 
(0.7118) 
 
-0.0174 
[-0.4435] 
(0.6579) 
 
-0.1071 
[-0.8454] 
(0.3991) 
 
-0.1109 
[-0.8671] 
(0.3871) 
 
  -0.0034 
[-0.1086] 
(0.9137) 
 
-0.0062 
[-0.1942] 
(0.8463) 
 
-0.0503 
[-0.5134] 
(0.6085) 
 
-0.0544 
[-0.5615] 
(0.5754) 
 
CRISIS CODE       0.0182 
[0.4282] 
(0.6691) 
 
0.0085 
[0.2019] 
(0.8403) 
 
0.0191 
[0.4850] 
(0.6284) 
 
0.0181 
[0.4621] 
(0.6447) 
 
0.0120 
[0.2942] 
(0.7690) 
 
0.0107 
[0.2672] 
(0.7897) 
 
1M RET.(-1)  -0.0435 
[-0.7981] 
(0.4259) 
 
 -0.0466 
[-0.8516] 
(0.3956) 
 
 -0.0471 
[-0.8688] 
(0.3862) 
 
 -0.0697 
[-1.2032] 
(0.2309) 
 
 -0.0704 
-1.2136] 
(0.2269) 
 
 -0.0708 
[-1.2325] 
(0.2198) 
 
C 0.0048** 
[2.1891] 
(0.0300) 
 
0.0046** 
[2.0661] 
(0.0404) 
 
0.0047** 
[2.1859] 
(0.0302) 
 
0.0046** 
[2.1016] 
(0.0371) 
 
0.0043** 
[2.0105] 
(0.0460) 
 
0.0042* 
[1.9274] 
(0.0556) 
 
-0.0002 
[-0.0971] 
(0.9228) 
 
-0.0004 
[-0.1564] 
(0.8760) 
 
-0.0003 
[-0.0979] 
(0.9222) 
 
-0.0007 
[-0.2622] 
(0.7936) 
 
-0.0002 
[-0.0829] 
(0.9341) 
 
-0.0006 
[-0.2527] 
(0.8008) 
 
VSTOXX -0.0256 
[-0.8069] 
(0.4208) 
 
-0.0514 
[-1.2207] 
(0.2239) 
 
-0.0283 
[-0.8958] 
(0.3716) 
 
-0.0543 
[-1.2993] 
(0.1956) 
 
-0.0284 
[-0.9001] 
(0.3694) 
 
-0.0546 
[-1.3331] 
(0.1843) 
 
-0.0181 
[-0.4824] 
(0.6302) 
 
-0.0545 
[-1.1431] 
(0.2549) 
 
-0.0203 
[-0.5414] 
(0.5891) 
 
-0.0555 
[-1.1678] 
(0.2448) 
 
-0.0211 
[-0.5569] 
(0.5784) 
 
-0.0564 
[-1.1961] 
(0.2336) 
 
INT 0.1157*** 
[3.8481] 
(0.0002) 
 
0.1150*** 
[3.8913] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.1151*** 
[3.9406] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.1167*** 
[4.0392] 
(0.0001) 
 
0.1105*** 
[3.5376] 
(0.0005) 
 
0.1121*** 
[3.6271] 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0752 
[1.5653] 
(0.1197) 
 
0.0711 
[1.4897] 
(0.1385) 
 
0.0749* 
[1.7061] 
(0.0901) 
 
0.0756* 
[1.7405] 
(0.0839) 
 
0.0701 
[1.4528] 
 (0.1485) 
 
0.0707 
[1.4781] 
(0.1416) 
 
RET 0.1979*** 
[3.5326] 
(0.0005) 
 
0.2093*** 
[3.4862] 
(0.0006) 
 
0.1978*** 
[3.5239] 
(0.0005) 
 
0.2082*** 
[3.4891] 
(0.0006) 
 
0.1952*** 
[3.4547] 
(0.0007) 
 
0.2057*** 
[3.4388] 
(0.0007) 
 
0.3402*** 
[5.5628] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3599*** 
[5.4541] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3410*** 
[5.3223] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3631*** 
[5.3202] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3360*** 
[5.6693] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3582*** 
[5.6567] 
(0.0000) 
 
PER 0.8330*** 
[12.636] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.8249*** 
[12.638] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.8268*** 
[12.409] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.8218*** 
[12.5498] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.8195*** 
[12.435] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.8144*** 
[12.543] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.7826*** 
[12.2639] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.7671*** 
[12.303] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.7786*** 
[12.007] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.7668*** 
[12.288] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.7747*** 
[11.746] 
(0.0000) 
 
0.7629*** 
[11.977] 
(0.0000) 
 
INF -0.0259 
[-1.0789] 
(0.2822) 
 
-0.0246 
[-0.9512] 
(0.3429) 
 
-0.0286 
[-1.1404] 
(0.2557) 
 
-0.0253 
[-0.9514] 
(0.3427) 
 
-0.0087 
[-0.3155] 
(0.7528) 
 
-0.0053 
[-0.1811] 
(0.8565) 
 
-0.0534 
[-1.6139] 
(0.1087) 
 
-0.0473 
[-1.3924] 
(0.1659) 
 
-0.05671 
[-1.6308] 
(0.1051) 
 
-0.0498 
[-1.4142] 
(0.1595) 
 
-0.0451 
[-1.3320] 
(0.1849) 
 
-0.0379 
[-1.0974] 
(0.2743) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.7700 
 
0.7683 
 
0.7687 
 
0.7686 
 
0.7697 
 
0.7697 
 
0.8188 
 
0.8196 
 
0.8179 
 
0.8196 
 
0.8173 
 
0.8190 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. United States suffers from two crises during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. ***,**,* 
indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A19: BELGIUM, OLS, SEPARATE PERIODS 
 
Crisis 1, May 2007-October 2008, 34 obs. Crisis 2 
PURERSENT 0.3751*** 
[3.4582] 
(0.0016) 
 
 0.4765*** 
[3.1876] 
(0.0033) 
 
0.2983* 
[1.8600] 
(0.0727) 
 
 0.3969 
[1.6595] 
(0.1078) 
 
      
PURERSENT(-1)  0.1995 
[1.4708] 
(0.1514) 
 
-0.1400 
[-0.7229] 
(0.4754) 
 
 0.1131 
[0.8971] 
(0.3768) 
 
-0.1377 
[-0.6412] 
(0.5265) 
 
      
1M RETURN(-1)    0.1725 
[1.0166] 
(0.3175) 
 
0.2723* 
[2.0276] 
(0.0516) 
 
0.1714 
[1.0623] 
(0.2969) 
 
      
C -0.0236** 
[-2.4138] 
(0.0217) 
 
-0.0235* 
[-1.9486] 
(0.0604) 
 
-0.0219* 
[-2.0319] 
(0.0511) 
 
-0.0192* 
[-1.9919] 
(0.0556) 
 
-0.0171 
[-1.6082] 
(0.1183) 
 
-0.0182* 
[-1.8001] 
(0.0822) 
 
      
Adjusted R2 0.1138 
 
0.0088 
 
0.0950 
 
0.1099 
 
0.0469 
 
0.0895 
 
      
 
Non-Crisis 1, 76 obs. Non-Crisis 2, 59 obs. 
PURERSENT -0.0867 
[-0.6284] 
(0.5317) 
 
 0.5873** 
[2.0962] 
(0.0396) 
 
-0.0230 
[-0.2273] 
(0.8208) 
 
 0.5302* 
[1.9417] 
(0.0561) 
 
-0.2169** 
[-2.0687] 
(0.0431) 
 
 -0.2236 
[-1.6336] 
(0.1080) 
 
-0.2241** 
[-2.3067] 
(0.0249) 
 
 -0.2188 
[-1.5944] 
(0.1167) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  -0.1905* 
[-1.8418] 
(0.0696) 
 
-0.7019*** 
[-2.9994] 
(0.0037) 
 
 -0.1706* 
[-1.9151] 
(0.0594) 
 
-0.6356*** 
[-2.6573] 
(0.0097) 
 
 -0.1789 
[-1.3162] 
(0.1935) 
 
0.0061 
[0.0287] 
(0.9772) 
 
 -0.1894 
[-1.4854] 
(0.1432) 
 
-0.0066 
[-0.0330] 
(0.9738) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    0.2447** 
[2.5587] 
(0.0126) 
 
0.2300** 
[2.2743] 
(0.0259) 
 
0.1915** 
[2.1356] 
(0.0362) 
 
   -0.0393 
[-0.3043] 
(0.7620) 
 
-0.0487 
[-0.4144] 
(0.6802) 
 
-0.0399 
[-0.3362] 
(0.7380) 
 
C 0.0053 
[0.7334] 
(0.4656) 
 
0.0092 
[1.4532] 
(0.1504) 
 
0.0078 
[1.2939] 
(0.1998) 
 
0.0047 
[0.8036] 
(0.4243) 
 
0.0080 
[1.5069] 
(0.1362) 
 
0.0070 
[1.3492] 
(0.1816) 
 
0.0009 
[0.1423] 
(0.8873) 
 
0.0018 
[0.2575] 
(0.7978) 
 
0.0010 
[0.1436] 
(0.8864) 
 
0.0011 
[0.1580] 
(0.8750) 
 
0.0018 
[0.2503] 
(0.8033) 
 
0.0011 
[0.1438] 
(0.8862) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0000 
 
0.0231 
 
0.0953 
 
0.0344 
 
0.0635 
 
0.1197 
 
0.0303 
 
0.0147 
 
0.0132 
 
0.0147 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Belgium suffers from one crisis and two non-crisis periods during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in 
parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A20: DENMARK, OLS, SEPARATE PERIODS 
 
Crisis 1, October 2000-September 2002, 38 obs. Crisis 2, September 2007-October 2008, 31 obs. 
PURERSENT -0.1118 
[-0.6619] 
(0.5123) 
 -0.1164 
[-0.6608] 
(0.5132) 
 
-0.1169 
[-0.6762] 
(0.5035) 
 
 -0.1160 
[-0.6573] 
(0.5155) 
 
0.4473*** 
[3.7402] 
(0.0008) 
 
 0.6705* 
[1.9362] 
(0.0634) 
 
0.4765*** 
[4.4788] 
(0.0001) 
 
 0.7584* 
[2.0122] 
(0.0547) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  -0.0343 
[-0.2107] 
(0.8344) 
 
-0.0344 
[-0.1970] 
(0.8450) 
 
 -0.0381 
[-0.2302] 
(0.8193) 
 
-0.0349 
[-0.1960] 
(0.8458) 
 
 0.3619** 
[2.3831] 
(0.0242) 
 
-0.2593 
[-0.6106] 
(0.5466) 
 
 0.3594*** 
[2.8939] 
(0.0074) 
 
-0.2935 
[-0.6993] 
(0.4906) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    0.0032 
[0.0297] 
(0.9765) 
 
-0.0224 
[-0.1992] 
(0.8433) 
 
-0.0028 
[-0.0255] 
(0.9798) 
 
   -0.0871 
[-0.6103] 
(0.5468) 
 
0.0056 
[0.0379] 
(0.9700) 
 
-0.1058 
[-0.7163] 
(0.4802) 
 
C -0.0086 
[-0.8697] 
(0.3903) 
 
-0.0082 
[-0.9213] 
(0.3632) 
 
-0.0096 
[-0.9920] 
(0.3282) 
 
-0.0093 
[-0.8984] 
(0.3753) 
 
-0.0084 
[-0.8781] 
(0.3860) 
 
-0.0096 
[-0.9541] 
(0.3470) 
 
-0.0061 
[-0.7059] 
(0.4859) 
 
-0.0106 
[-1.1349] 
(0.2660) 
 
-0.0066 
[-0.6968] 
(0.4919) 
 
-0.0077 
[-0.8614] 
(0.3966) 
 
-0.0106 
[-1.1557] 
(0.2579) 
 
-0.0067 
[-0.6833] 
(0.5005) 
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1724 0.0999 0.1350 0.1306 0.0666 0.1105 
 
Non-Crisis 1, 31 obs. Non-Crisis 2, 58 obs. 
PURERSENT -0.1295 
[-0.8366] 
(0.4096) 
 
 -0.2656 
[-1.1652] 
(0.2541) 
 
-0.0574 
[-0.2660] 
(0.7923) 
 
 -0.2609 
[-1.0847] 
(0.2880) 
 
-0.0198 
[-0.1699] 
(0.8657) 
 
 0.2357 
[0.9767] 
(0.3331) 
 
-0.0022 
[-0.0172] 
(0.9863) 
 
 0.2669 
[1.1345] 
(0.2617) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  0.1012 
[0.4460] 
(0.6590) 
 
0.2916 
[1.0059] 
(0.3234) 
 
 0.0934 
[0.3904] 
(0.6993) 
 
0.2847 
[0.9316] 
(0.3601) 
 
 -0.1282 
[-1.0405] 
(0.3027) 
 
-0.3134 
[-1.2248] 
(0.2260) 
 
 -0.1295 
[-0.9980] 
(0.3227) 
 
-0.3396 
[-1.3435] 
(0.1848) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    -0.0649 
[-0.5044] 
(0.6181) 
 
-0.0494 
[-0.3629] 
(0.7196) 
 
-0.0227 
[-0.1731] 
(0.8639) 
 
   -0.1021 
[-1.0489] 
(0.2989) 
 
-0.1040 
[-1.0144] 
(0.3149) 
 
-0.1287 
[-1.2771] 
(0.2071) 
 
C 0.0174* 
[1.9371] 
(0.0625) 
 
0.0083 
[0.7427] 
(0.4638) 
 
0.0139 
[1.1867] 
(0.2457) 
 
0.0152 
[1.1053] 
(0.2788) 
 
0.0092 
[0.7280] 
(0.4729) 
 
0.0142 
[1.1737] 
(0.2512) 
 
0.0144** 
[2.1078] 
(0.0395) 
 
0.0142** 
[2.2416] 
(0.0290) 
 
0.0136** 
[2.0808] 
(0.0422) 
 
0.0146* 
[1.7800] 
(0.0807) 
 
0.0158* 
[1.9932] 
(0.0513) 
 
0.0154* 
[1.9045] 
(0.0623) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0020 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0003 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Denmark suffers from two crises and two non-crisis periods during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in 
parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A21: FRANCE, OLS, SEPARATE PERIODS 
 
Crisis 1, August 2000-August 2002, 39 obs. Crisis 2, May 2007-February 2009, 34 obs. 
PURERSENT 0.1676 
[1.4040] 
(0.1686) 
 
 0.3148 
[1.4464] 
(0.1570) 
 
0.1709 
[1.3317] 
(0.1916) 
 
 0.3147 
[1.4252] 
(0.1632) 
 
0.4004** 
[2.4415] 
(0.0203) 
 
 0.5190*** 
[2.7969] 
(0.0089) 
 
0.3426* 
[1.7843] 
(0.0845) 
 
 0.4847** 
[2.1554] 
(0.0396) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  0.0501 
[0.4096] 
(0.6845) 
 
-0.1912 
[-0.8048] 
(0.4264) 
 
 0.0515 
[0.3835] 
(0.7037) 
 
-0.1905 
[-0.7713] 
(0.4459) 
 
 0.1687 
[1.1498] 
(0.2590) 
 
-0.1806 
[-0.8441] 
(0.4053) 
 
 0.0810 
[0.5579] 
(0.5811) 
 
-0.2270 
[-1.0336] 
(0.3099) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    -0.0198 
[-0.1584] 
(0.8751) 
 
-0.0072 
[-0.0532] 
(0.9579) 
 
-0.0032 
[-0.0256] 
(0.9797) 
 
   0.1665 
[1.1705] 
(0.2510) 
 
0.2510* 
[1.8153] 
(0.0795) 
 
0.1990 
[1.6265] 
(0.1147) 
 
C -0.0235** 
[-2.2193] 
(0.0327) 
 
-0.0195* 
[-1.8872] 
(0.0672) 
 
-0.0208* 
[-1.9869] 
(0.0548) 
 
-0.0239** 
[-2.0918] 
(0.0438) 
 
-0.0197* 
[-1.7870] 
(0.0826) 
 
-0.02084 
[-1.8760] 
(0.0693) 
 
-0.0315*** 
[-3.8694] 
(0.0005) 
 
-0.0236* 
[-1.9356] 
(0.0621) 
 
-0.0288** 
[-2.7363] 
(0.0103) 
 
-0.0268*** 
[-2.8471] 
(0.0079) 
 
-0.0163 
[-1.2933] 
(0.2058) 
 
-0.0227** 
[-2.0848] 
(0.0460) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0018 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.1341 
 
0.0000 
 
0.1209 
 
0.1282 
 
0.0227 
 
0.1282 
 
 
Non-Crisis 1, 26 obs. Non-Crisis 2, 56 obs. 
PURERSENT -0.0479 
[-0.4708] 
(0.6420) 
 
 0.0041 
[0.0356] 
(0.9719) 
 
-0.1009 
[-0.7677] 
(0.4508) 
 
 -0.0208 
[-0.1356] 
(0.8934) 
 
0.0108 
[0.0720] 
(0.9429) 
 
 0.2258 
[0.7435] 
(0.4605) 
 
0.0054 
[0.0326] 
(0.9741) 
 
 0.2180 
[0.6654] 
(0.5088) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  -0.2013 
[-1.1732] 
(0.2527) 
 
-0.2029 
[-1.0789] 
(0.2923) 
 
 -0.2226 
[-1.2632] 
(0.2197) 
 
-0.2149 
[-1.0849] 
(0.2902) 
 
 -0.1996 
[-1.4165] 
(0.1625) 
 
-0.3411 
[-1.1358] 
(0.2613) 
 
 -0.1988 
[-1.4368] 
(0.1568) 
 
-0.3357 
[-1.0762] 
(0.2869) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    -0.4110** 
[-2.1165] 
(0.0458) 
 
-0.4153** 
[-2.1533] 
(0.0425) 
 
-0.4164** 
[-2.1237] 
(0.0457) 
 
   -0.0704 
[-0.4410] 
(0.6610) 
 
-0.0686 
[-0.4508] 
(0.6540) 
 
-0.0465 
[-0.2969] 
(0.7677) 
 
C 0.0127** 
[2.5651] 
(0.0170) 
 
0.0124** 
[2.4573] 
(0.0220) 
 
0.01239** 
[2.4617] 
(0.0221) 
 
0.0191*** 
[3.2763] 
(0.0035) 
 
0.0176*** 
[3.1387] 
(0.0048) 
 
0.0175*** 
[2.9734] 
(0.0072) 
 
0.0041 
[0.7283] 
(0.4696) 
 
-8.42E-05 
[-0.0114] 
(0.9909) 
 
0.0017 
[0.2695] 
(0.7886) 
 
0.0045 
[0.7299] 
(0.4687) 
 
0.0002 
[0.0257] 
(0.9796) 
 
0.0018 
[0.2734] 
(0.7856) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0981 
 
0.1410 
 
0.1005 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0217 
 
0.0351 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0078 
 
0.0184 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. France suffers from two crises and two non-crisis periods during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in 
parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A22: GERMANY, OLS, SEPARATE PERIODS 
 
Crisis 1, August 2000-August 2002, 39 obs. Crisis 2, December 2007-February 2009, 28 obs. 
PURERSENT 0.2904*** 
[2.8622] 
(0.0069) 
 
 0.3779 
[1.1827] 
(0.2449) 
 
0.2772*** 
[2.8459] 
(0.0074) 
 
 0.4295 
[1.0847] 
(0.2857) 
 
0.3397* 
[1.9322] 
(0.0643) 
 
 0.5286 
[1.6720] 
(0.1075) 
 
0.4032** 
[2.5802] 
(0.0164) 
 
 0.5337* 
[1.7452] 
(0.0943) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  0.2246** 
[2.2773] 
(0.0288) 
 
-0.1106 
[-0.3407] 
(0.7353) 
 
 0.2309** 
[2.1683] 
(0.0370) 
 
-0.1764 
[-0.4219] 
(0.6757) 
 
 0.2657 
[1.2418] 
(0.2259) 
 
-0.2048 
[-0.4878] 
(0.6301) 
 
 0.3101* 
[1.7412] 
(0.0945) 
 
-0.1597 
[-0.4299] 
(0.6712) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    0.0236 
[0.2075] 
(0.8369) 
 
-0.0199 
[-0.1542] 
(0.8783) 
 
0.0632 
[0.4043] 
(0.6886) 
 
   -0.1113 
[-0.6187] 
(0.5419) 
 
-0.0793 
[-0.4829] 
(0.6335) 
 
-0.0885 
[-0.5946] 
(0.5579) 
 
C -0.0253** 
[-2.3106] 
(0.0265) 
 
-0.0271** 
[-2.4036] 
(0.0215) 
 
-0.0255** 
[-2.2261] 
(0.0325) 
 
-0.0256** 
[-2.3255] 
(0.0260) 
 
-0.0276** 
[-2.2650] 
(0.0298) 
 
-0.0235* 
[-1.8956] 
(0.0665) 
 
-0.0198 
[-1.6476] 
(0.1115) 
 
-0.0222 
[-1.5497] 
(0.1338) 
 
-0.0195 
[-1.3036] 
(0.2047) 
 
-0.0249* 
[-2.0338] 
(0.0532) 
 
-0.0249* 
[-1.7595] 
(0.0912) 
 
-0.0225 
[-1.6417] 
(0.1142) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0596 
 
0.0241 
 
0.0283 
 
0.0262 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0030 
 
0.0814 
 
0.0334 
 
0.0561 
 
0.0566 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0211 
 
 
Non-Crisis 1, 33 obs. Non-Crisis 2, 54 obs. 
PURERSENT 0.0851 
[0.4017] 
(0.6906) 
 
 -0.0531 
[-0.16940] 
(0.8667) 
 
0.0176 
[0.0769] 
(0.9393) 
 
 -0.1612 
[-0.4911] 
(0.6272) 
 
0.1450 
[1.2999] 
(0.1993) 
 
 0.7625*** 
[3.0569] 
(0.0036) 
 
0.2174* 
[1.9819] 
(0.0529) 
 
 0.7935*** 
[2.8771] 
(0.0059) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  0.1011 
[0.6717] 
(0.5069) 
 
0.1392 
[0.6763] 
(0.5042) 
 
 0.1153 
[0.6193] 
(0.5406) 
 
0.2345 
[1.0677] 
(0.2948) 
 
 -0.1320 
[-1.0610] 
(0.2936) 
 
-0.7123*** 
[-2.7465] 
(0.0083) 
 
 -0.1249 
[-0.9452] 
(0.3490) 
 
-0.7473** 
[-2.5960] 
(0.0124) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    -0.1521 
[-0.9062] 
(0.3723) 
 
-0.1653 
[-0.8618] 
(0.3959) 
 
-0.2065 
[-1.1073] 
(0.2776) 
 
   -0.0558 
[-0.5083] 
(0.6135) 
 
-0.0497 
[-0.4039] 
(0.6880) 
 
0.0808 
[0.7092] 
(0.4815) 
 
C 0.0178 
[1.5840] 
(0.1233) 
 
0.0198** 
[2.1362] 
(0.0409) 
 
0.0193* 
[1.7608] 
(0.0888) 
 
0.0189 
[1.5094] 
(0.1420) 
 
0.0226* 
[1.7793] 
(0.0857) 
 
0.0217 
[1.6138] 
(0.1178) 
 
0.0045 
[0.5075] 
(0.6139) 
 
0.0149*** 
[2.7238] 
(0.0088) 
 
0.0052 
[0.7531] 
(0.4549) 
 
-0.0001 
[-0.0160] 
(0.9873) 
 
0.0151*** 
[2.7542] 
(0.0081) 
 
0.0044 
[0.6473] 
(0.5204) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0025 
 
0.0000 
 
0.2331 
 
0.0145 
 
0.0000 
 
0.2241 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Germany suffers from two crises and two non-crisis periods during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in 
parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A23: ITALY, OLS, SEPARATE PERIODS 
 
Crisis 1, April 2007-December 2008, 35 obs. Crisis 2 
PURERSENT -0.0993 
[-0.6064] 
 (0.5484) 
 
 0.0547 
[0.2952] 
(0.7698) 
 
-0.1190 
[-0.8819] 
(0.3846) 
 
 0.0402 
[0.2278] 
(0.8213) 
 
      
PURERSENT(-1)  -0.2050 
[-1.0246] 
(0.3132) 
 
-0.2403 
[-0.9244] 
(0.3624) 
 
 -0.2211 
[-1.1668] 
(0.2522) 
 
-0.2470 
[-0.9238] 
(0.3629) 
 
      
1M RETURN(-1)    0.2758** 
[2.0772] 
(0.0462) 
 
0.2805** 
[2.0458] 
(0.0493) 
 
0.2793* 
[2.0034] 
(0.0542) 
 
      
C -0.0244* 
[-1.9257] 
(0.0628) 
 
-0.0291* 
[-1.7371] 
(0.0920) 
 
-0.0288* 
[-1.7161] 
(0.0961) 
 
-0.0203* 
[-1.8195] 
(0.0785) 
 
-0.0239 
[-1.6324] 
(0.1127) 
 
-0.0238 
[-1.6235] 
(0.1149) 
 
      
Adjusted R2 0.0000 
 
0.0121 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0268 
 
0.0637 
 
0.0335 
 
      
 
Non-Crisis 1, 75 obs. Non-Crisis 2, 59 obs. 
PURERSENT -0.1801* 
[-1.9052] 
(0.0607) 
 
 0.3369 
[1.3271] 
(0.1887) 
 
-0.2211** 
[-2.1730] 
(0.0331) 
 
 0.2623 
[0.9530] 
(0.3439) 
 
0.0344 
[0.3190] 
(0.7509) 
 
 0.1674 
[0.4377] 
(0.6633) 
 
0.0584 
[0.5155] 
(0.6083) 
 
 0.2312 
[0.5934] 
(0.5554) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  -0.2559*** 
[-2.8429] 
(0.0058) 
 
-0.5643** 
[-2.2011] 
(0.0310) 
 
 -0.2835*** 
[-2.9817] 
(0.0039) 
 
-0.5190* 
[-1.8990] 
(0.0617) 
 
 0.0074 
[0.0786] 
(0.9376) 
 
-0.1414 
[-0.3827] 
(0.7034) 
 
 0.0127 
[0.1291] 
(0.8977) 
 
-0.1918 
[-0.5116] 
(0.6110) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    -0.1599* 
[-1.6815] 
(0.0971) 
 
-0.1537* 
[-1.8167] 
(0.0735) 
 
-0.1281 
[-1.3843] 
(0.1707) 
 
   -0.1159 
[-1.0848] 
(0.2827) 
 
-0.1081 
[-0.9682] 
(0.3372) 
 
-0.1316 
[-1.1240] 
(0.2660) 
 
C 0.0046 
[0.9679] 
(0.3363) 
 
0.0068 
[1.5363] 
(0.1288) 
 
0.0064 
[1.3950] 
(0.1674) 
 
0.0057 
[1.0382] 
(0.3027) 
 
0.0076 
[1.5331] 
(0.1297) 
 
0.0071 
[1.4177] 
(0.1607) 
 
0.0016 
[0.2479] 
(0.8051) 
 
0.0014 
[0.1920] 
(0.8485) 
 
0.0019 
[0.2804] 
(0.7802) 
 
0.0032 
[0.4195] 
(0.6765) 
 
0.0017 
[0.2171] 
(0.8289) 
 
0.0025 
[0.3297] 
(0.7429) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0192 
 
0.0525 
 
0.0580 
 
0.0296 
 
0.0626 
 
0.0602 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Italy suffers from one crisis and two non-crisis periods during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in parentheses. 
***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A24: SPAIN, OLS, SEPARATE PERIODS 
 
Crisis 1, September 2000-September 2002, 37 obs. Crisis 2,October 2007-February 2009, 30 obs. 
PURERSENT -0.1459 
[-1.2021] 
(0.2374) 
 
 -0.6021* 
[-1.9571] 
(0.0588) 
 
-0.1284 
[-0.9761] 
(0.3361) 
 
 -0.6075* 
[-1.8290] 
(0.0767) 
 
0.2248** 
[2.1967] 
(0.0365) 
 
 -0.4795** 
[-2.1398] 
(0.0419) 
 
0.1819* 
[1.9332] 
(0.0642) 
 
 -0.5369** 
[-2.2031] 
(0.0370) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  0.0578 
[0.3824] 
(0.7045) 
 
0.5636 
[1.5734] 
(0.1252) 
 
 0.0476 
[0.3098] 
(0.7586) 
 
0.5700 
[1.4918] 
(0.1455) 
 
 0.3954*** 
[3.9428] 
(0.0005) 
 
0.8002*** 
[3.4116] 
(0.0021) 
 
 0.3959*** 
[3.8926] 
(0.0006) 
 
0.8216*** 
[3.4152] 
(0.0022) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    -0.0744 
[-0.7842] 
(0.4385) 
 
-0.0675 
[-0.6814] 
(0.5004) 
 
0.0123 
[0.1254] 
(0.9010) 
 
   0.0349 
[0.3440] 
(0.7336) 
 
-0.0019 
[-0.0216] 
(0.9830) 
 
0.0971 
[1.1718] 
(0.2523) 
 
C -0.0167* 
[-1.9224] 
(0.0627) 
 
-0.0147 
[-1.6275] 
(0.1129) 
 
-0.0177* 
[-1.9507] 
(0.0596) 
 
-0.0172* 
[-1.8081] 
(0.0797) 
 
-0.0158* 
[-1.7568] 
(0.0882) 
 
-0.0175* 
[-1.9691] 
(0.0577) 
 
-0.0143* 
[-1.8194] 
(0.0796) 
 
-0.0180*** 
[-3.0689] 
(0.0048) 
 
-0.01994*** 
[-2.9657] 
(0.0064) 
 
-0.0160* 
[-1.9648] 
(0.0602) 
 
-0.0181*** 
[-2.9860] 
(0.0061) 
 
-0.0185*** 
[-2.8792] 
(0.0081) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0560 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0267 
 
0.0166 
 
0.1251 
 
0.1626 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0915 
 
0.1378 
 
 
Non-Crisis 1, 33 obs. Non-Crisis 2, 58 obs. 
PURERSENT 0.1668 
[0.8308] 
(0.4125) 
 
 0.5873*** 
[3.3479] 
(0.0023) 
 
0.1721 
[0.7949] 
(0.4331) 
 
 0.5672*** 
[3.2137] 
(0.0033) 
 
0.1129 
[1.1360] 
(0.2608) 
 
 0.2958 
[1.5110] 
(0.1366) 
 
0.1126 
[1.0012] 
(0.3212) 
 
 0.2868 
[1.4121] 
(0.1638) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  -0.0854 
[-0.4783] 
(0.6359) 
 
-0.5360** 
[-2.6554] 
(0.0127) 
 
 -0.0758 
[-0.3883] 
(0.7007) 
 
-0.5134** 
[-2.3887] 
(0.0239) 
 
 -0.0020 
[-0.0199] 
(0.9842) 
 
-0.2401 
[-1.2265] 
(0.2253) 
 
 0.0141 
[0.1287] 
(0.8980) 
 
-0.2174 
[-1.0604] 
(0.2938) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    -0.1549 
[-0.7795] 
(0.4420) 
 
-0.1546 
[-0.7958] 
(0.4326) 
 
-0.1127 
[-0.5156] 
(0.6102) 
 
   -0.1567 
[-1.3742] 
(0.1751) 
 
-0.1510 
[-1.2994] 
(0.1993) 
 
-0.1447 
[-1.2198] 
(0.2279) 
 
C 0.0235** 
[2.1080] 
(0.0432) 
 
0.0112 
[0.9646] 
(0.3424) 
 
0.0141 
[1.1961] 
(0.2413) 
 
0.0255* 
[2.0043] 
(0.0545) 
 
0.0140 
[1.1126] 
(0.2750) 
 
0.0160 
[1.2489] 
(0.2220) 
 
-0.0029 
[-0.3012] 
(0.7644) 
 
0.0010 
[0.1148] 
(0.9090) 
 
-0.0011 
[-0.1208] 
(0.9043) 
 
-0.0035 
[-0.3273] 
(0.7447) 
 
0.0007 
[0.0726] 
(0.9424) 
 
-0.0014 
[-0.1290] 
(0.8978) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0905 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0719 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Spain suffers from two crises and two non-crisis periods during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in 
parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A25: SWEDEN, OLS, SEPARATE PERIODS 
 
Crisis 1, August 2000-June 2002, 37 obs. Crisis 2 
PURERSENT 0.0020 
[0.0147] 
(0.9883) 
 
 -0.1409 
[-0.4844] 
(0.6313) 
 
-0.0537 
[-0.4397] 
(0.6630) 
 
 -0.1473 
[-0.4818] 
(0.6332) 
 
      
PURERSENT(-1)  0.0089 
[0.0552] 
(0.9563) 
 
0.1165 
[0.3548] 
(0.7250) 
 
 0.0094 
[0.0589] 
(0.9534) 
 
0.1221 
[0.3595] 
(0.7216) 
 
      
1M RETURN(-1)    0.0396 
[0.3043] 
(0.7628) 
 
0.0372 
[0.2858] 
(0.7768) 
 
0.0457 
[0.3272] 
(0.7457) 
 
      
C -0.0219* 
[-1.8165] 
(0.0779) 
 
-0.0240** 
[-2.1117] 
(0.0421) 
 
-0.0248** 
[-2.2344] 
(0.0323) 
 
-0.0232* 
[-1.9660] 
(0.0578) 
 
-0.0232* 
[-1.9597] 
(0.0585) 
 
-0.0239** 
[-2.0899] 
(0.0447) 
 
      
Adjusted R2 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
      
 
Non-Crisis 1, 132 obs. Non-Crisis 2 
PURERSENT 0.0044 
[0.0395] 
(0.9685) 
 
 0.2804 
[1.3716] 
(0.1726) 
 
0.0070 
[0.0644] 
(0.9488) 
 
 0.2775 
[1.2309] 
(0.2206) 
 
      
PURERSENT(-1)  -0.0974 
[-0.6963] 
(0.4875) 
 
-0.3272 
[-1.3441] 
(0.1813) 
 
 -0.0975 
[-0.7135] 
(0.4769) 
 
-0.3248 
[-1.2278] 
(0.2218) 
 
      
1M RETURN(-1)    0.0409 
[0.5129] 
(0.6089) 
 
0.0422 
[0.5046] 
(0.6147) 
 
0.0075 
[0.0807] 
(0.9358) 
 
      
C 0.0076 
[1.5454] 
(0.1247) 
 
0.0076 
[1.5140] 
(0.1325) 
 
0.0073 
[1.5119] 
(0.1330) 
 
0.0070 
[1.3800] 
(0.1700) 
 
0.0072 
[1.3834] 
(0.1689) 
 
0.0072 
[1.4035] 
(0.1629) 
 
      
Adjusted R2 0.0000 
 
0.0018 
 
0.0202 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0126 
 
      
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. Sweden suffers from one crisis and two non-crisis periods during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in 
parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A26: UNITED KINGDOM, OLS, SEPARATE PERIODS 
 
Crisis 1, August 2000-July 2002, 37 obs. Crisis 2,October 2007-October 2008, 29 obs. 
PURERSENT 0.0440 
[0.2704] 
(0.7885) 
 
 0.0154 
[0.0920] 
(0.9273) 
 
0.0035 
[0.0202] 
(0.9840) 
 
 0.0239 
[0.1453] 
(0.8854) 
 
0.2604* 
[1.8363] 
(0.0773) 
 
 -0.2134 
[-0.9181] 
(0.3674) 
 
0.2544* 
[1.8255] 
(0.0799) 
 
 -0.2030 
[-0.8391] 
(0.4097) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  -0.0282 
[-0.1529] 
(0.8794) 
 
-0.0361 
[-0.1845] 
(0.8547) 
 
 -0.0273 
[-0.1426] 
(0.8875) 
 
-0.0396 
[-0.2003] 
(0.8425) 
 
 0.3971** 
[2.5001] 
(0.0191) 
 
0.5683** 
[2.2189] 
(0.0358) 
 
 0.4196** 
[2.6066] 
(0.0152) 
 
0.5799** 
[2.2135] 
(0.0366) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    -0.0583 
[-0.4775] 
(0.6361) 
 
-0.0575 
[-0.4943] 
(0.6243) 
 
-0.0600 
[-0.5033] 
(0.6182) 
 
   -0.0487 
[-0.3623] 
(0.7202) 
 
-0.0905 
[-0.8399] 
(0.4089) 
 
-0.0805 
[-0.7000] 
(0.4907) 
 
C -0.0186** 
[-2.2655] 
(0.0298) 
 
-0.0146* 
[-1.7059] 
(0.0972) 
 
-0.0149 
[-1.5532] 
(0.1299) 
 
-0.0167* 
[-1.8507] 
(0.0732) 
 
-0.0155* 
[-1.7292] 
(0.0931) 
 
-0.0160 
[-1.5801] 
(0.1239) 
 
-0.0109* 
[-1.7524] 
(0.0911) 
 
-0.0114** 
[-2.3797] 
(0.0249) 
 
-0.0123** 
[-2.3127] 
(0.0293) 
 
-0.0128* 
[-1.8283] 
(0.0795) 
 
-0.0122** 
[-2.1689] 
(0.0398) 
 
-0.0130** 
[-2.1718] 
(0.0400) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0333 
 
0.1253 
 
0.1078 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0986 
 
0.0774 
 
 
Non-Crisis 1, 33 obs. Non-Crisis 2, 56 obs. 
PURERSENT 0.2124 
[1.4740] 
(0.1506) 
 
 0.3377 
[1.5015] 
(0.1440) 
 
0.3926** 
[2.2785] 
(0.0302) 
 
 0.4902** 
[2.5118] 
(0.0181) 
 
-0.0026 
[-0.0321] 
(0.9745) 
 
 0.0707 
[0.2258] 
(0.8223) 
 
0.0040 
[0.0478] 
(0.9621) 
 
 0.1615 
[0.5338] 
(0.5958) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  0.0372 
[0.3077] 
(0.7604) 
 
-0.1754 
[-0.9195] 
(0.3654) 
 
 0.1320 
[0.8230] 
(0.4172) 
 
-0.1568 
[-0.8449] 
(0.4053) 
 
 -0.0228 
[-0.2949] 
(0.7692) 
 
-0.0884 
[-0.2839] 
(0.7776) 
 
 -0.0196 
[-0.2304] 
(0.8187) 
 
-0.1693 
[-0.5565] 
(0.5803) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    -0.5271*** 
[-3.2411] 
(0.0030) 
 
-0.4329** 
[-2.4407] 
(0.0210) 
 
-0.5234*** 
[-3.2870] 
(0.0027) 
 
   -0.2623** 
[-2.4851] 
(0.0162) 
 
-0.2618** 
[-2.4366] 
(0.0183) 
 
-0.2694** 
[-2.5063] 
(0.0154) 
 
C 0.0039 
[0.8675] 
(0.3924) 
 
0.0088* 
[1.8861] 
(0.0690) 
 
0.0061 
[1.3079] 
(0.2012) 
 
0.0051 
[1.1645] 
(0.2537) 
 
0.0103* 
[1.8602] 
(0.0730) 
 
0.0066 
[1.2954] 
(0.2058) 
 
0.0052 
[1.3936] 
(0.1691) 
 
0.0044 
[1.1544] 
(0.2535) 
 
0.0045 
[1.1893] 
(0.2397) 
 
0.0064 
[1.3805] 
(0.1734) 
 
0.0060 
[1.2695] 
(0.2099) 
 
0.0062 
[1.3328] 
(0.1885) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.0143 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0061 
 
0.2541 
 
0.1232 
 
0.2438 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0329 
 
0.0333 
 
0.0181 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. United Kingdom suffers from two crises and two non-crisis periods during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in 
parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
  
  
TABLE A27: UNITED STATES, OLS, SEPARATE PERIODS 
 
Crisis 1, August 2000-July 2002, 33 obs. Crisis 2, October 2007-October 2008, 29 obs. 
PURERSENT 0.1305 
[0.6272] 
(0.5351) 
 
 0.4876* 
[1.7937] 
(0.0833) 
 
0.1637 
[0.6898] 
(0.4958) 
 
 0.5274* 
[1.9986] 
(0.0554) 
 
0.1402 
[0.8378] 
(0.4095) 
 
 -0.2297 
[-0.3284] 
(0.7453) 
 
0.1345 
[1.0323] 
(0.3118) 
 
 -0.0082 
[-0.0121] 
(0.9904) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  -0.0793 
[-0.4360] 
(0.6660) 
 
-0.4516 
[-1.6611] 
(0.1075) 
 
 -0.0725 
[-0.3688] 
(0.7150) 
 
-0.4715** 
[-2.2421] 
(0.0331) 
 
 0.1838 
[1.4865] 
(0.1492) 
 
0.3826 
[0.5774] 
(0.5688) 
 
 0.1549 
[1.3808] 
(0.1796) 
 
0.1621 
[0.2459] 
(0.8078) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    -0.1352 
[-1.1367] 
(0.2650) 
 
-0.1054 
[-1.1690] 
(0.2519) 
 
-0.1603* 
[-1.9980] 
(0.0555) 
 
   0.3662*** 
[2.9738] 
(0.0064) 
 
0.3409*** 
[2.8596] 
(0.0084) 
 
0.3395** 
[2.0784] 
(0.0485) 
 
C -0.0262 
[-1.1789] 
(0.2474) 
 
-0.0072 
[-0.3953] 
(0.6954) 
 
-0.0142 
[-0.7870] 
(0.4377) 
 
-0.0287 
[-1.1008] 
(0.2800) 
 
-0.0092 
[-0.4521] 
(0.6545) 
 
-0.0178 
[-0.7645] 
(0.4510) 
 
-0.0176 
[-1.3569] 
(0.1860) 
 
-0.0193 
[-1.5857] 
(0.1249) 
 
-0.0205 
[-1.6051] 
(0.1210) 
 
-0.0132 
[-1.5175] 
(0.1417) 
 
-0.0140 
[-1.6580] 
(0.1098) 
 
-0.0141 
[-1.4500] 
(0.1600) 
 
R2 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0439 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0373 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0747 
 
0.0811 
 
0.0428 
 
 
Non-Crisis 1, 37 obs. Non-Crisis 2, 56 obs. 
PURERSENT 0.1247 
[0.9482] 
(0.3495) 
 
 0.2849** 
[2.6329] 
(0.0128) 
 
0.1851 
[1.1130] 
(0.2738) 
 
 0.3706** 
[2.6428] 
(0.0126) 
 
0.1215 
[0.8273] 
(0.4117) 
 
 0.4630* 
[1.8838] 
(0.0652) 
 
0.1196 
[0.6981] 
(0.4882) 
 
 0.4138* 
[1.7039] 
(0.0945) 
 
PURERSENT(-1)  -0.1193 
[-0.7004] 
(0.4885) 
 
-0.2882* 
[-1.7020] 
(0.0982) 
 
 -0.0965 
[-0.5205] 
(0.6062) 
 
-0.3056 
[-1.5817] 
(0.1236) 
 
 -0.0548 
[-0.4034] 
(0.6883) 
 
-0.4258** 
[-2.2963] 
(0.0257) 
 
 -0.0278 
[-0.1876] 
(0.8519) 
 
-0.3664** 
[-2.4063] 
(0.0198) 
 
1M RETURN(-1)    -0.2434 
[-1.5379] 
(0.1336) 
 
-0.1769 
[-1.1992] 
(0.2390) 
 
-0.2580 
[-1.5810] 
(0.1237) 
 
   -0.1987 
[-1.3968] 
(0.1684) 
 
-0.1962 
[-1.3974] 
(0.1682) 
 
-0.1449 
[-1.1438] 
(0.2580) 
 
C 0.0065** 
[2.2101] 
(0.0337) 
 
0.0095** 
[2.5782] 
(0.0144) 
 
0.0080** 
[2.4668] 
(0.0190) 
 
0.0077** 
[2.2019] 
(0.0348) 
 
0.0105** 
[2.6248] 
(0.0130) 
 
0.0091** 
[2.4845] 
(0.0184) 
 
0.0157*** 
[3.1772] 
(0.0025) 
 
0.0095*** 
[2.7656] 
(0.0078) 
 
0.0121*** 
[2.7578] 
(0.0080) 
 
0.0178*** 
[3.0150] 
(0.0040) 
 
0.0128*** 
[2.8183] 
(0.0068) 
 
0.0145*** 
[2.8575] 
(0.0062) 
 
R2 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0103 
 
0.0109 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0458 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0443 
 
0.0179 
 
0.0039 
 
0.0465 
 
The dependent variable is the one month return. The time period looked upon is 2000-2014. United States suffers from two crises and two non-crisis periods during this period. Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets and p-values in 
parentheses. ***,**,* indicate the significance levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. 
 
 
